Cultural Stereotypes in the maps by Yanko Tsvetkov. Europe is laughing

The silent Finn, talkative Italian, reserved Englishman and German decent - those circulating stereotypes can be found in the art. More specifically, in the maps of stereotypes, which outlined the Bulgarian who lives in London, a designer and illustrator

Yanko Tsvetkov
. His work, which consists of maps of Europe, reflecting the cultural stereotypes of individual nations, is breaking record audience - his work has been already seen by almost half a billion Internet users. He has created seven fairly specific map of Europe. The viewer can see the vision of our continent by Americans, Britons, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Bulgarians and. .. Gay. And it's not idyllic pictures. It seems that the Old Continent is a multi-cultural melting pot of stereotypes and prejudices.

Europe according to France
And so, according to the French, Russia is "a dream of Napoleon," Poland "country plumbers" and the German "fatherland best friends."

Europe according to Britain
The British believe the Norwegians as "selfish fishermen," Russia is called "paranoid empire of oil", and the entire Community, "the Union of subsidized farmers.

Europe according to USA
Viewed from New York, Europe is as follows: the east: "buffer zones", ie Polish, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary and the Baltic States like a huge country, Just south is the state,"Dracula. The west border of the Buffer Zone is called sharp Porno. Americans see Spain on the Iberian Peninsula of Mexico. Indeed - the same language, similar culture, and of these women ... Italy - many godfathers. The Netherlands is the "Sodom". And honest UK is affectionately referred to as "Mama.

Europe according to Germany

See all maps and more work of the designer and illustrator Yanko Tsvetkov here http://alphadesigner.com/project-mapping-stereotypes.html

Ein Gespräch mit Joseph Beuys (1985)

Joseph Beuys (1921-1986), Jannis Kounellis (*1936),
Anselm Kiefer (*1945), Enzo Cucchi (*1950), »Ein Gespräch«

Die folgende Diskussion zwischen vier europäischen Künstlern schreibt eine bestimmte Linie moderner Kunsttheorie fort, die schon immer versucht hat, radikale Kunst und radikale Politik zwar aufeinander zu beziehen, dabei aber nicht die eine in der anderen aufgehen zu lassen. Dieses Projekt ist auf denkbar verschiedene Weisen formuliert worden, aber ein politischer Utopismus und die Tendenz, eine Veränderung von Bewußtsein und Gefühl als Voraussetzung konkreter Wirklichkeitsveränderung anzu-nehmen statt umgekehrt, gehören zu seinen langlebigsten Denkmotiven. Das Gespräch wurde am 4./5.6. und 28729.10.1985 in der Kunsthalle Basel geführt und von Jean-Christophe Ammann moderiert. - Ein Gespräch: Joseph Beuys. Jannis Kounellis. Anselm Kiefer. Enzo Cucchi, hrsg. von Jacqueline Burckhardt, Zürich: Parkett, 1986, Zürich: Parkett / Ostfildern: Cantz, 41994, S.158-162, 167-170.


Dienstag vormittag [29. 10. 1985]

***
KIEFER: Für mich gab es immerzu Menschen, die reduziert, und solche, die weniger reduziert waren, und dann hochgeistige Menschen, durch alle Zeiten und Kulturen hindurch.

BEUYS: Du sprichst jetzt von einem individuellen, menschlichen Schicksal. Es werden natürlich in Zukunft auch weiterhin Kranke und Blinde leben. Und es wird weiterhin alle verschiedenen Höhen von Fähigkeiten geben. Aber es werden alle Fähigkeiten entwickelbar, das Niveau wird gesteigert werden.
KOUNELLIS: Ja, aber die Kathedrale von Köln weist auf eine Zentralität hin, umfaßt eine Kultur und weist auf die Zukunft. Sonst würden wir riskieren, Nomaden zu werden.
BEUYS: Die Kathedrale von Köln ist eine schlechte Skulptur. Sie wäre gut als Bahnhof. Chartres ist besser. Aber was Kounellis von der Kathedrale sagt, ist ein schönes Bild. Wir müssen eine Kathedrale bauen!
KOUNELLIS: Ganz genau.
BEUYS: Die Kathedrale steht jetzt hier unter uns. Die alten Kathedralen stehen irgendwo in einer Welt, die noch rund war. Aber dann wurde die Welt durch den Materialismus reduziert. Es war aber eine innere Notwendigkeit, sie so zu verengen, denn dadurch wurde das menschliche Bewußtsein geschärft, ganz besonders in seiner analytischen Tätigkeit. Jetzt müssen wir eine Synthese vollziehen mit all unseren Kräften, und das ist die Kathedrale.
KIEFER: Ich habe ein unheimlich ungutes Gefühl, wenn Beuys meint, daß sich alle Menschen verändern würden, wenn man einen Begriff verändert. Es gab doch immer solche und andere.
BEUYS: Das ist doch selbstverständlich. Es handelt sich doch um die Anhebung des Niveaus auf allen Gebieten. Wir haben doch festgestellt, daß das Niveau so niedrig ist wie noch nie in der Geschichte. Man soll nur mal schauen, wie sich die Menschen in ihren Wohnungen einrichten. Noch nie haben sie so unwürdig gewohnt.

KIEFER: Das sagen wir jetzt. Aber Du weißt ja nicht, was die Leute in hundert oder sogar fünfzig Jahren sagen.
BEUYS: Die Leute werden es dann erkennen und das Zeug in den Müll werfen. Das tun sie jetzt schon. Nach einem halben Jahr werfen sie die Sachen weg und kaufen sich etwas Neues. Die Leute sind in diesen Wohnungen todunglücklich. Dabei ist das menschliche Wohnen einer der wichtigsten und elementarsten Ausdrücke ihres Kunstsinnes. Der ästhetische Sinn ist heute, wie nie in der Geschichte, gestört. Also bauen wir die Kathedrale!
KOUNELLIS: Eben. Dieser Exzeß des Nomadismus und dieser Exzeß der Ablehnung der Kultur schaffen eine absurde Situation.
KIEFER: Das Niveaugefälle ist mir klar. Aber das letzte Mal haben wir uns gefragt, weshalb ein unverdorbener primitiver Eingeböfenflf, wenn er seine Plästikschüssel erhält, die seine sofort wegwirft.

BEUYS: Sie sind verführbar geworden, weil die alten Stammeskulturen für unsere Zeit nicht mehr gelten. [...] Es wäre besser, diese Menschen würden sich entwickeln können. Aber natürlich werden diese Menschen dem Kapitalismus unterworfen und sterben auch meistens daran. Das kann man am baskischen Problem z.B. sehr gut sehen. Die Basken sind wohl der zurückgelassene Rest irgendeines nomadischen Volkes. Es gibt tausend Theorien, daß sie aus Asien kamen und vielleicht durch die Bestrafung des Stammesfürsten zurückgelassen wurden. Nun sitzen sie da und versuchen immer wieder, ihre alte Stammeskultur aufrechtzuerhalten. Aber sie haben keine eigene Literatur entwickelt, alles geht über die orale Tradition. Jetzt stellen sie mit Recht ganz bestimmte Forderungen.

AMMANN: Warum führst Du dieses Beispiel der Basken an?
BEUYS: Ich führe das Beispiel an, weil das Umfeld der EG, in dem die Basken sich befinden, den Machenschaften des Systems der westlichen Geldwirtschaft entspricht. D.h. die spanische Regierung gibt den Basken keine Autonomie, und deshalb entsteht ein Problem - wie in Nordirland. Ich habe in Spanien den Vorschlag gemacht, man solle den Basken die volle Autonomie geben.

Die Spanier meinen, daß die Basken dann verkommen würden, weil sie keine eigene Kultur hätten. Ich habe aber dann gesagt, die hätten wohl schon allein dadurch eine Kultur, daß sie die Absicht zur Selbstverwaltung hätten. Unter Umständen wäre es sogar möglich, daß dieses Volk, genau wie wir hier am Tisch, ein Konzept für seine eigene Wirtschaft entwirft, das für viele Leute modellhaft sein könnte. Wenn man den Basken die Selbstbestimmung gäbe, dann wäre das mit Sicherheit etwas ganz anderes. Das wäre doch eine große Chance, etwas Modellhaftes zu entwickeln, das wir wie ein Kunstwerk betrachten könnten. Wir könnten uns dann unter Umständen mit ihnen zusammensetzen und etwas Modellhaftes für die ganze Welt entwickeln.

CUCCHI: Die Methode der Basken ist interessant, weil sie den Terrorismus benützen. Ich weiß nicht, wohin uns der Terrorismus führt.
BEUYS: Der Terrorismus führt nicht zur Lösung der Frage. Er führt uns zu einem ganz langweiligen, konservativen Gesellschaftssystem.
CUCCHI: Nein, das habe ich nicht gemeint. Ich frage mich nur, welche Gefühle heute dem Terrorismus innewohnen, was die Form des Terrorismus sei. Sowohl die Basken wie auch die Nordirländer benutzen diesen Codex.

***
KOUNELLIS: Innerhalb von Europa gibt es sehr viele Völker, die unabhängig sein wollen, z.B. die Sizilianer, die Sarden, die Korsen u.a.
BEUYS: Das ist doch positiv.
KOUNELLIS: Ja, das ist positiv. Aber es ist auch sehr positiv, über die Kathedrale von Köln zu sprechen, glicht nur diejenigen, die sich abtrennen wollen, sind positiv.

BEUYS: Die Kathedrale von Chartres ist dann positiv, wenn man feststellt, daß solche Selbständigkeitsbestrebungen an ein anderes System heranführen, damit die Korsen, Sarden, Basken, Irländer und Schotten überhaupt eine Kathedrale bauen können. Sie dürfen aber nie die Machenschaften des Kapitalismus kopieren. Ich bin überzeugt, daß die Basken das richtig machen. Bei den Schotten bin ich nicht so sicher. Man muß doch an einem kleinen Kern anfangen und in eine übersichtliche Menschengemeinschaft ein anderes Prinzip bringen. Die Idee der Kathedrale bedeutet ein anderes Verständnis von Kultur, Recht, Geist, Wirtschaft usw. Wenn die Spanier den Basken die Autonomie geben würden, dann würde ich sogleich dahin gehen, und die Basken würden sagen, wir brauchen nichts dringender als solche Gespräche. Denn alles muß auf neuen Fundamenten errichtet werden. Wir wollen nicht das kopieren, worunter wir jahrhundertelang gelitten haben. Wir wollen das jetzt ganz auf einen neuen Boden stellen, auf den Boden der Kunst. Sie wollen den Gesellschaftskörper als ein Kunstwerk haben.

Der Terrorismus verhindert aber diese Bestrebungen, denn er gibt den größeren Staaten und Mächten neue Argumente, immer mehr Polizei einzusetzen, ein Militärstaat zu werden. Der Kapitalismus ist ja glücklich, den Terrorismus zu haben. Der wird vom Kapitalismus künstlich gezüchtet.

***
BEUYS: In bezug auf den erweiterten Kunstbegriff bin ich auf der Suche nach dem Dümmsten. Und wenn ich den Dümmsten, der auf dem allerniedrigsten Niveau ist, gefunden habe, dann habe ich sicher den Intelligentesten gefunden, den potentiell am meisten Vermögenden. Und der ist Träger der Kreativität. Die sogenannte Intelligenz, die sich die Leute wie ein Messer in den Kopf stecken, ergibt nur ein vordergründiges Bild, und diese Intelligenz muß zerstört werden. Die Dumpfheit muß beteiligt werden, denn in ihr existieren doch alle anderen Kräfte, wie ein wilder Wille, ein irres Gefühls¬leben und vielleicht ein ganz anderes Erkennen. Vielleicht leben die schon im Himmel.
KIEFER: Das ist eine persönliche Idee von Dir, Beuys.

BEUYS: Nein. Das geht über meine Person hinaus. Meine Person ist vollkommen uninteressant. Ich versuche nur, Kräfteverhältnisse in der Welt darzustellen, die heute so sind, wie sie sind, und morgen anders sein müssen. Und ich versuche, das an Beispielen klarzumachen.

***
BEUYS: [...] Wir sprechen hier doch nicht zusammen, um unser Verhältnis, das sowieso gut ist, zu verbessern. Wir sind hier, um die Kathedrale zu bauen.
KOUNELLIS: Die Konstruktion der Kathedrale ist die Konstruktion der sichtbaren Sprache.
BEUYS: Das ist ein wichtiges Detail. Heute ist aber alles möglich, und so kommt die Kathedrale nicht zustande. Wir haben uns geeinigt, eine Kathedrale bauen und zu einer wirklichen Menschenkultur kommen zu wollen. Aber wie diese Kathedrale aussehen soll und aus welchem Material sie gebaut wird, darüber haben wir keinen Konsens.

KOUNELLIS: Beuys hat schwer gelitten, mehr als wir alle. Das ist ein Gefühl, das ich habe, denn er hat ein Mißtrauen, grundsätzliche Dinge mit Offenheit zu diskutieren.
BEUYS: Offenheit ist natürlich auch ein bißchen ein veralteter Begriff. Viele Menschen finden sich sehr fortschrittlich und auf der Höhe, wenn sie von der sogenannten Offenheit sprechen. Aber die Offenheit muß natürlich zu einer präzisen Bestimmtheit werden. Sonst ist die Offenheit nichts anderes, als daß alles möglich ist. Ich sage aber, es ist fast nichts Möglich. Für1 die Disponilität eines jeden menschlichen Gesichtspunktes muß man ein Wahmehmungsorgan haben. Aber wenn man zu einem Konsens kommen will, muß aus der Offenheit eine ganz bestimmte Form werden, eine Verdichtung, und die ist das entgegengesetzte Bild zur Offenheit. Die Offenheit ist auch ein Propagandawort. Wir sind mit diesem Wort verführt worden. Man sprach von Offenheit, von pluralistischer Gesellschaft, d.h., daß alles im Grunde möglich ist; und man wollte nur ja keine speziellen Wege und Prinzipien, denn die verlangen eine präzise ausgearbeitete Form.
KOUNELLIS: Wir sind aber Individuen die sich nicht beeinflussen lassen.

BEUYS: Die Offenheit soll menschlich, anthropologisch auf das Individuum bezogen sein; offen für das, was der andere meint.
KOUNELLIS: Wir reden von einer Offenheit im Inneren von Europa, wo sich die Kulturen sehr nahe sind, trotz der Unterschiede.
BEUYS: Die heutige Kultur ist aber gerade nicht geprägt durch die gotischen Dome, sondern durch ein führendes Wirtschaftssystem, das die Kunst an die Peripherie oder in die Nicht-Existenz gedrängt hat. Und wenn jetzt das ganze System bankrott geht, weil die Wirtschaftskultur auf falschen Füßen steht, gibt es für die Kunst wieder die große Chance, eine echte Kultur in allen Zusammenhängen aufzubauen und nicht ein reduktionistisches Gebilde. Ich wehre mich einfach dagegen, daß dieses Mikrophon, das hier vor uns auf dem Tisch steht, nicht zur Kultur gehören soll.

KOUNELLIS: Solange das Mikrophon so auf dem Tisch steht, kann es nicht zur Kultur gehören. Wenn Beuys es aber auf den Filz stellt, dann wird es Teil der Kultur. Denn Beuys hat die Macht, das Mikrophon in Kultur umzuwandeln.
BEUYS: Aber die Macht nützt nur mir, das führt zurück auf mein individuelles Tun und nicht zur Kathedrale.
KOUNELLIS: Nein, das nützt allen, und das hat auch mit der Kathedrale zu tun.

***
BEUYS: [...] In bezug auf die Kunst als dem alleinigen Mittel, um die Kathedrale zu bauen, brauche ich doch die gesprochene Sprache.
KIEFER: Bevor der Künstler gestorben ist, kann man nicht vollständig feststellen, was er auf der ganzen Breite mit seinem Werk gemeint hat. BEUYS: Ich kann doch aber sagen, wie ich es gemeint habe.
KIEFER: Das, was Du dazu gesagt hast, ist aber nur ein kleiner Teil der wirklichen Tragweite.
BEUYS: Das stimmt doch gar nicht, daß der Künstler erst nach seinem Tode zum Sprechen kommt. Aber vielleicht ist das wahr, daß der tote Künstler besser als der lebende ist.

Sol Lewitt - Paragraphs on Conceptual Art (1967 and 1969)

The editor has written me is in in favor of avoiding "that the artist is a kind of ape that has to be explained by the civilized critic". This should be good new to both art an apes. With this assurence I hope to justify this confidence. To continue a baseball metaphor (one artist wanted to hit the ball out of the park, another to stay loose at the plate and hit the ball where it was pitched I am grateful for the opportunity to strike out for myself.

I will refer to the kind of art in which I am involved as conceptual art. In conceptual art the idea of concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made before¬hand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. This kind of art is not theoretical or illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of mental processes and it is purposeless. It is usually free from the dependence on the skill of the artist as a craftsman.

It is the objective of the artist who is concerned with conceptual art to make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and there¬fore usually he would want it to become emotionally dry. There is no reason to suppose however, that the conceptual artist is out to bore the viewer. It is only the expectation of an emotional kick, to which one conditioned to expressionist art is accustomed, that would deter the viewer from perceiving this art.

Conceptual art is not necessarily logical. The logic of a piece or series of pieces is a device that is used at times only to be ruined. Logic may be used to camouflage the real in¬tent of the artist, to lull the viewer into the belief that he understands the work, or to infer a paradoxical situation (such as logic vs. illogic). The ideas need not be complex. Most ideas that are successful are ludicrously simple. Successful ideas generally have the appearance of simplicity because they seem inevitable. In terms of idea the artist is free to even surprise himself. Ideas are discovered by intuition.

What the work of art looks like isn't too important. It has to look like something if it has physical form. No matter what form it may finally have it must begin with an idea. It is the process of conception and realization with which the artist is concerned. Once given physical reality by the artist the work is open to the perception of all, including the artist. (I use the word "perception" to mean the apprehension of the sense data, the objective understanding of the idea and simultaneously a subjective interpretation of both.) The work of art can only be perceived after it is completed.

Art that is meant for the sensation of the eye primarily would be called perceptual rather than conceptual. This would include most optical, kinetic, light and color art.
Since the functions of conception and perception are contradictory (one pre-, the other postfact) the artist would mitigate his idea by applying subjective judgment to it. If the artist wishes to explore his idea thoroughly, then arbitrary or chance decisions would be kept to a minimum, while caprice, taste and other whimsies would be eliminated from the making of the art. The work does not necessarily have to be rejected if it does not look well. Sometimes what is initially thought to be awkward will eventually be visually pleasing.

To work with a plan that is preset is one way of avoiding subjectivity. It also obviates the necessity of designing each work in turn. The plan would design the work. Some plans would require millions of variations, and some a limited number, but both are finite. Other plans imply infinity. In each case however, the artist would select the basic form and rules that would govern the solution of the problem. After that the fewer decisions made in the course of completing the work, the better. This eliminates the arbitrary, the capricious, and the subjective as much as possible. That is the reason for using this method.

When an artist uses a multiple modular method he usually chooses a simple and readily available form. The form itself is of very limited importance; it becomes the grammar for the total work. In fact it is best that the basic unit be deliberately uninteresting so that it may more easily become an intrinsic part of the entire work. Using complex basic forms only disrupts the unity of the whole. Using a simple form repeatedly narrows the field of the work and concentrates the intensity to the arrangement of the form. This arrangement becomes the end while the form becomes the means.

Conceptual art doesn't really have much to do with mathematics, philosophy or any other mental discipline. The mathematics used by most artists is simple arithmetic or simple number systems. The philosophy of the work is implicit in the work and is not an illustration of any system of philosophy.

It doesn't really matter if the viewer understands the concepts of the artist by seeing the art. Once out of his hand the artist has no control over the way a viewer will perceive the work. Different people will understand the same thing in a different way.
Recently there has been much written about minimal art, but I have not discovered any¬one who admits to doing this kind of thing. There are other art forms around called primary structures, reductive, rejective, cool, and mini-art. No artist I know will own up to any of these either. Therefore I conclude that it is part of a secret language that art critics use when communicating with each other through the medium of art magazines.

Mini-art is best because it reminds one of mini-skirts and long-legged girls. It must refer to very small works of art. This is a very good idea. Perhaps mini-art shows could be sent around the country in matchboxes. Or maybe the mini-artist is a very small person, say under five feet tall. If so, much good work will be found in the primary schools (primary school primary structures).
If the artist carries through his idea and makes it into visible form, then all the steps in the process are of importance.

The idea itself, even if not made visual is as much a work of art as any finished product. All intervening steps—scribbles, sketches, drawings, failed work, models, studies, thoughts, conversations—are of interest. Those that show the thought process of the artist are sometimes more interesting than the final product.

Determining what size a. piece should be is difficult. If an idea requires three dimensions then it would seem any size would do. The question would be what size is best. If the thing were made gigantic then the size alone would be impressive and the idea may be lost entirely. Again, if it is too small, it may become inconsequential. The height of the viewer may have some bearing on the work and also the size of the space into which it will be placed. The artist may wish to place objects higher than the eye level of the viewer, or lower.

I think the piece must be large enough to give the viewer whatever information he needs to understand the work and placed in such a way that will facilitate this understanding. (Unless the idea is of impediment and requires difficulty of vision or access.)
Space can be thought of as the cubic area occupied by a three-dimensional volume. Any volume would occupy space. It is air and cannot be seen. It is the interval between things that can be measured. The intervals and measurements can be important to a work of art.

If certain distances are important they will be made obvious in the piece. If space is relatively unimportant it can be regularized and made equal (things placed equal distances apart), to mitigate any interest in interval. Regular space might also become a metric time element, a kind of regular beat or pulse. When the interval is kept regular whatever is irregular gains more importance.

Architecture and three-dimensional art are of completely opposite natures. The former is concerned with making an area with a specific function. Architecture, whether it is a work of art or not, must be utilitarian or else fail completely. Art is not utilitarian. When three-dimensional art starts to take on some of the characteristics of architecture such as forming utilitarian areas it weakens its function as art. When the viewer is dwarfed by the large size of a piece this domination emphasizes the physical and emotive power of the form at the expense of losing the idea of the piece.

New materials are one of the great afflictions of contemporary art. Some artists confuse new materials with new ideas. There is nothing worse than seeing art that wallows in gaudy baubles. By and large most artists who are attracted to these materials are the ones that lack the stringency of mind that would enable them to use the materials well. It takes a good artist to use new materials and make them into a work of art. The danger is, I think, in making the physicality of the materials so important that it becomes the idea of the work (another kind of expressionism).

Three-dimensional art of any kind is a physical fact. This physicality is its most obvious and expressive content. Conceptual art is made to engage the mind of the viewer rather than his eye or emotions. The physicality of a three-dimensional object then becomes a contradiction to its non-emotive intent. Color, surface, texture, and shape only emphasize the physical aspects of the work. Anything that calls attention to and interests the viewer in this physicality is a deterrent to our understanding of the idea and is used as an expressive device. The conceptual artist would want to ameliorate this emphasis on materiality as much as possible or to use it in a paradoxical way. (To convert it into an idea.) This kind of art then, should be stated with the most economy of means. Any idea that is better stated in two dimensions should not be in three dimensions. Ideas may also be stated with numbers, photographs, or words or any way the artist chooses, the form being unimportant.

These paragraphs are not intended as categorical imperatives but the ideas stated are as close as possible to my thinking at this time. These ideas are the result of my work as an artist and are subject to change as my experience changes. I have tried to state them with as much clarity as possible.

If the statements I make are unclear it may mean the thinking is unclear. Even while writing these ideas there seemed to be obvious inconsistencies (which I have tried to correct, but others will probably slip by). I do not advocate a conceptual form of art for all artists. I have found that it has worked well for me while other ways have not. It is one way of making art: other ways suit other artists. Nor do I think all conceptual art merits the viewer's attention. Conceptual art is only good when the idea is good.

Sentences on Conceptual Art (1969)
1. Conceptual Artists are mystics rather than rationalists. They leap to conclusions that logic cannot reach.
2. Rational judgements repeat rational judgements.
3. Illogical judgements lead to new experience.
4. Formal Art is essentially rational.
5. Irrational thoughts should be followed absolutely and logically.
6. If the artist changes his mind midway through the execution of the piece he compromises the result and repeats past results.
7. The artist's will is secondary to the process he initiates from idea to completion. His wilfulness may only be ego.
8. When words such as painting and sculpture are used, they connote a whole tradition and imply a consequent acceptance of this tradition, thus placing limitations on the artist who would be reluctant to make art that goes beyond the limitations.
9. The concept and idea are different. The former implies a general direction while the latter are the components. Ideas implement the concept.
10. Ideas alone can be works of art; they are in a chain of development that may eventually find some form. All ideas need not be made physical.
11. Ideas do not necessarily proceed in logical order. They may set one off in unexpected directions but an idea must necessarily be completed in the mind before the next one is formed.
12. For each work of art that becomes physical there are many variations that do not.
13. A work of art may be understood as a conductor from the artist's mind to the viewer's. But it may never reach the viewer, or it may never leave the artist's mind.
14. The words of one artist to another may induce an idea's chain, if they share the same concept.
15. Since no form is intrinsically superior to another, the artist may use any form, from an expression of words (written or spoken) to physical reality, equally.
16. If words are used, and they proceed from ideas about art, then they are art and not literature, numbers are not mathematics.
17. AH ideas are art if they are concerned with art and fall within the conventions of art.
18. One usually understands the art of the past by applying the conventions of the present thus misunderstanding the art of the past.
19. The conventions of art are altered by works of art.
20. Successful art changes our understanding of the conventions by altering our perceptions.
21. Perception of ideas leads to new ideas.
22. The artist cannot imagine his art, and cannot perceive it until it is complete.
23. One artist may mis-perceive (understand it differently than the artist) a work of art but still be set off in his own chain of thought by that misconstrual.
24. Perception is subjective.
25. The artist may not necessarily understand his own art. His perception is neither better nor worse than that of others.
26. An artist may perceive the art of others better than his own.
27. The concept of a work of art may involve the matter of the piece or the process in which it is made.
28. Once the idea of the piece is established in the artist's mind and the final form is decided, the process is carried out blindly. There are many side-effects that the artist can¬not imagine. These may be used as ideas for new works.
29. The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It should run its course.
30. There are many elements involved in a work of art. The most important are the most obvious.
31. If an artist uses the same form in a group of works, and changes the material, one would assume the artist's concept involved the material.
32. Banal ideas cannot be rescued by beautiful execution.
33. It is difficult to bungle a good idea.
34. When an artist learns his craft too well he makes slick art.
35. These sentences comment on art, but are not art.


* Sol LeWitt, "Sentences on Conceptual Art," o-g (January 1969): 4; reprinted in Art-Language 1 (1969): 11-13; and in Ursula Meyer, Conceptual Art (New York: Penguin 1972), 174-75.

Mel Bochner: a Book Review on Lucy Lippard's classic "The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972" (1973)

MEL BOCHNER Book Review (1973)

A point has been reached, with the publication of Lucy Lippard's book The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972, where certain propositions can no longer go unquestioned. The understanding of the importance of these propositions will come only from an investigation of the internal contradictions of the book itself which, in turn, will reveal its hidden theoretical and ethical implications. As is often the case, the covert meaning of the structure differs from the expressed intentions.


Mel Bocliner, Language Is Not Transparent, 1969-70, chalk and paint on wall installation, Dwan Gallery, Language Show.-

To document the history of six years of extremely active and possibly radical art requires a sense of responsibility to the spirit of the art itself. The bibliographic processes must be systematic, clear, informed, and consistent within the chosen theoretical framework. Lippard's book does not satisfy these criteria. The plan of the book as presented on the jacket is an "intentional reflection of the chaotic network connected with so-called conceptual art. ..." In her preface the author writes frequently and positively of "fragmentation"; "Fragmentation is more like direct communication than the traditionally unified approach in which superfluous literary transitions are introduced." Support of this updated McLuhanism lies in the dense, chaotic, "fragmented" mixture of type sizes, faces, and weights which lies, in constant and confusing reversal, books (alphabetically by author) and exhibitions or mailing pieces (chronologically by month and year). Lippard insistently substitutes the fragmentation method for what she considers the fallacia consequentis of continuity, i.e., "superfluous literary transitions." The problem of this format is not one of "superfluous literary transitions" but of an arbitrary mode of selection camouflaged by a supposedly objective presentation of primary data. The visually impenetrable layout with its list and jump-cuts presents a parody of her assumptions about the content of this art. The "design" mimics certain stylistic conventions of Conceptual art. While fragmentation is held to be a more accurate organizing principle, it is contradicted on every other page by the insertion of editorial comments and by chronological preferences. Chaos resulting from this type of operation is not inherent chaos, but a symptom of an unwillingness, or inability, to define particular issues.

A refusal to acknowledge more rigorous structural principles demonstrated by this art results in a book-length pastiche. Parodistic imitation appeared earlier in Lippard's writing, most notably her introduction in The Museum of Modern Art's Information exhibition catalogue, and her contribution to the Sol LeWitt catalogue published in The Hague, Netherlands, two years ago. For this occasion she did a typographic "rendition" of a LeWitt grid drawing with the heading "Imitation-Hommage." Imitation on the part of a critic is a form of self-indulgence. In this book, and several previous catalogues of exhibitions, it has been disguised as a "document" and presented in an unchallenged context because of the advertised closeness between artist and critic: "The editor has been closely involved with the art and artists since their emergence" (jacket blurb). This "involvement" lends an authority and uncontestability to what is explicitly an uncritical endeavor.

The critic as historian is no more acceptable than the critic as artist, unless the methodology is changed. Without this change the surreptitious slide from one role to the other slurs the neutrality essential to historical evaluation. Unlike the critic, who can function without criticizing the given assumptions of the artist's order, historians are obliged to present a context for their examination of contradictions in the existing order. There is also a cultural distinction to be made. A critic has a "job," a historian has a "position." The language distinction reveals that the critic is accepted as a functionary of the endeavor (in the capacity of a distributor of information), but that the historian is accorded the privileges of distance from the marketplace. That Lippard would prefer to present her activities as history is not surprising. This suppresses the issue of partiality. But in her presentation, the role of historian is transformed from analyst to apologist, and the writing of immediate history tempts her to participate in its making. Because distance is sacrificed, and analytical thought dismissed as "literary transitions," history is frozen into an individualistic perspective unaware of its undisclosed distortions and incapable of offering any insight into the relationship of the works themselves. The struggle between ideas is eliminated by bibliographies, timetables, or simple memoirs of individuals and accidental encounters.

In her own anticipated defense she writes ". . . the point I want to make is phenomenological not historical." The use of the word "phenomenology" in the current art vocabulary is an abuse of its meaning. When Husserl wrote "go to the things themselves" he was not suggesting the compilation of lists of "things," or the presentation of unexamined raw experiences. Phenomenology is the radical postulate of "presuppositionless lived experience" as a technique for the investigation of intentionality (how the world is our construction of it). It was not a withdrawal from analysis, but a method for bringing subjectivity under logical scrutiny. The consequences for philosophy itself inevitably involved a return to the questions of idealism and transcendental subjectivity. (This process came into the language of contemporary art criticism as a question of "objecthood versus objectness"— a case of trivialization, or simply a confusion with 19th-century Phenomenalism.) The problem of this misused terminology is that it incorrectly identifies the issues being argued in the art. It is the differentiation of the attitudes of these artists that is important, not the author's projected similarity of their stylistic means.

When Lippard claims no theoretical basis for selection, she nonetheless admits that she could not include everything that happened during that period (which would be like the map in Lewis Carroll's Silvie and Bruno, with the scale of one inch = one inch, obviating the need for any map at all). She offers the following rationale: "I would like this book to reflect that gradual deemphasis of sculptural concerns, and as the book evolves, I have deliberately concentrated on textual and photographic work" (italics mine).

The implications of the italicized words point up the contradiction between the expressed bibliographic structure of the book and the actual organizational principles. Lippard sees the book as having an internal evolution reflective of the evolution of Concept art from Minimal sculpture. Then she proposes the book as congruent with the period, setting herself up as the principle of selection by the method of "concentration." Her statement above is a disguised confession, particularly when juxtaposed with the opening claim: ". . . There is no precise reason for certain inclusions and exclusions except personal prejudice and an idiosyncratic method of categorization." There is nothing "idiosyncratic" about this reading of history. It has been central to general art-critical awareness for at least four years.

Lippard has personally emphasized this centrality in terms of the exhibitions she arranged, wrote about, and now cross-references.
In journalistically rejecting theoretical grounds, she ignores the covert line she is pushing. Acknowledgement of a theoretical basis for this art would reveal aspects antithetical to her premises: for example, it would become evident that many of the artists she lists outlined the premises of their art quite early, independent of more traditional concerns in sculpture, and that any development was not teleological. Lippard's lack of perspective leads her to patronize intentions, "Some artists now think it's absurd to fill up their studios with objects that won't be sold, and are trying to get their art communicated as rapidly as it is made." Her refusal to engage the complex and often contradictory intellectual questions being raised, reduces the intentions of an art attempting a forceful critique of the existing social and aesthetic order into a series of purely self-promotional activities.

The principles of exclusion deserve more attention. A basic tenet of the book is that a piece of mail is to be considered a work of art. Ray Johnson is eliminated, however, because it is said of his mailings that they would "confuse issues," and the book would become "unmanageable if some similarity of aesthetic intention were not maintained" (italics Lippard's). On the surface this appears to be an acceptable premise, yet why, then, does she exclude an artist of the stature of Dan Flavin, particularly since his art seriously investigated aspects of "dematerialization." Flavin certainly is not to be excluded on the grounds of a lack of
"aesthetic similarity," as he was one of the strongest proponents of the "lean-pared-down-look," and one of the first and most consequential artists to write theoretically about his art during the period in question.

The function of "fragmentation" can now be identified as a hidden exclusion principle. Lippard's form derives from the French "nouvelle roman," in books such as Butor's Mobile, which merely distort developmental logic rather than supplant it. In contrast, narrative fiction as a model yields a history of sequences ... if A then B, if B then C, if C . . . etc. What is offered is nothing more than a disguised remodeling of the patrimony theory of art history. The machinery of art history is designed to bestow legitimacy by forging a sequential development which accedes to the demands of causal reasoning for the existence of specific works of art. Artists who do not fit the simplified a priori causal schema or who do not conform to prescribed attitudes are eliminated.

The Dematerialization of the Art Object is not a conscious corruption of history. It is a victim of historical forces it is unable to acknowledge. To confront these forces requires an analysis of the political and economic issues that inform aesthetic problems. Books such as this one have a predetermined use demanded by the system of distribution. They function to shore up a position, establish theoretical domains, create hierarchies of individuals for the market, provide definitive reference works, and indoctrinate supporters. In this way, it is only another ideological handbook. But it is more dangerous because Lippard fronts a phantom objectivity, an autonomy that appears so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its purposes. To jump from a listing for a 1968 work by Lawrence Weiner to this entry, "Sept. 26 (1968) Amsterdam: Boezem sends out map and documentation of the day's weather report and meteorological analysis entitled 'Medium for the Furtherance of Renewed Experiences,' " is to debase the content of Weiner's art by juxtaposing it with an obvious neo-Fluxist ploy, such as declaring the weather map-as-art. This cannot be defended, as Lippard attempts in the preface by saying, "I have included certain work here because it illustrates . . . how far ideas can be taken before they become exhausted or totally absurd."
It simply is impossible for the uninitiated reader to distinguish a time-dissipation factor when the works enter the public domain almost simultaneously. Lippard's notion of how art informs other art is one of misguided democratization, defined as everybody can understand everything. Specific content is not important. The effect of this process is to present a mass of information, from which all contradictory and conflicting ideas have been factored out by juxtaposition. Yet Lippard proposes intuition and "fragmentation" in order to cover up the inconsistencies necessary to perpetuate the illusion of wholeness.

In the Lippard book, the inconsistencies are obvious. The volume is indexed. It lists the artists alphabetically and measures the amount of their comparative contributions. Lippard's biases are easy to reconstruct. This process facilitates the rating of an individual artist's "worth" by typographic weight. The index is a direct refutation of her opening claim to an "anti-individualistic" point of view, and functions as a very adequate replacement for "a traditionally unified approach."
This book is in a unique position, one enjoyed by few other art histories, except some dealing with ancient art. Much, if not most, of the art it records is no longer in existence.
The temporal continuity of these works is in the form and place given by this book. That is too arbitrary a process to let it slide unquestioned into the general culture.

The author has assumed a responsibility which cannot be reconciled with the technique of pasting old clippings and announcements together. This "assemblage" technique is rendered invisible by what Roland Barthes calls the "terrorism of the printed page." The device of the in¬visible narrator is a 19th-century novelistic device for composing historical fiction, in order to manipulate the unaware reader's responses.

Another serious issue is the self-fulfilling implication of the title itself. By attempting to imitate the future it distorts the present. Some art critics believe that their contribution to culture is enhanced by coining titles for "art movements." Her term, "dematerialization," has been filtering into general usage as a prescriptive device used in an ethical context. It suggests the immorality of artists who continue to make objects. A letter from the Art-Language group, published in this book, is an accurate analysis of the word and its misuse:

AH the examples of art-works (ideas) that you refer to in your article are, with few exceptions, art-objects. They may not be an art-object in this traditional matter-state, but they nevertheless are matter in one of its forms, solid-state, gas-state, liquid-state. And it is on this question of matter-state that my caution with regard to the metaphorical usage of dematerialization is centered upon . . . That some art should be directly material and that other art should produce a material entity only as a by-product of the need to record an idea is not at all to say that the latter is connected by any process of dematerialization to the former (italics mine).

Does this dissuade the author? No. She rephes in her preface, "Granted. But for the lack of a better term I have continued to refer to a process of dematerialization ..." (italics mine). The terminology perpetuates itself until it becomes total nonsense. "Keith Arnatt comes to 'idea art' via process or behavioral land art (a constant interest in hermeticism and holes) and a something-to-nothing development."
Because Lucy Lippard was able to acquire pertinent documents, and because she was in close proximity to the artists, this book, by virtue of its inconsistencies and misrepresentation of aesthetic intentions, can only be found severely defective as a useful work of scholarship. And for its falsifications, it can be called an act of bad faith to art.

* Mel Bocliner, "Book Review/Mrf/owm u, no. 10 (June 1973): 74-75.