Mister, Send Your Missile My Way (Gina Berriault 1961)
(I)
The scene is a Salt Lake City cafe. A man and woman are eating canned sausages and drinking coffee. The man has made a proposal and the woman refuses to 'live in sin' with him. So far it might be an everyday situation. But we know that this couple might be the last surviving humans after a nuclear war has covered the Earth in radioactive dust. Damon Knight's 'Not with a Bang' (1950: collected in Far Out) turns Eliot's description of the end of the world from 'The Hollow Men- into a sexual pun by dramatising a tug of wills between a randy survivor and a genteel librarian in a situation of destruction which makes such an opposition absurd.
In that respect his story represents an early example of treating the nuclear subject through black comedy, which reaches its climax in Dr. Strangelove (1963). Paul Brians has argued that such treatments represent an evasion: 'Absurdism is often a coping mechanism which allows one to shelve nuclear war mentally as simply one of life's insoluble quandaries' (Brians 1987a: 86).
Comic strategies, however, can turn a satirical spotlight on the assumptions which might cause nuclear war. Far from avoiding nuclear war, they deflect its morally oppressive weight, masking their local subjects with a deadpan narrative. For instance, Pat Frank's Mr. Adam (1946) labours the comedy of one man's retention of fertility after a nuclear plant explodes, but then dramatises his assimilation within superpower rivalry that could lead to war.
Perceptions of the absurdity of Cold War nuclear postures had been forcefully put in the fifties by two vigorous opponents of the arms race: the cultural historian Lewis Mumford and the sociologist C. Wright Mills. Both writers placed contradiction at the centre of their diagnoses. Mumford's collection In the Name of Sanity (1954) mounted a protest against the 'violence and irrationality of our times'.
Mumford found a direct contradiction between American 'totalitarian military instruments and our democratic political ends'. To him the superpowers were playing out an endgame whose meaningless would culminate in war. He warned apocalyptically of a total nullification of history: 'the chaos of a final wasteland in which all order and design derived from life have returned to aimless dust and rubble' (Mumford 1973a: 154-5, 161). Mills similarly declared in The Causes of World War Three (1958) that the 'drift and the thrust toward World War Three is now part of the contemporary sensibility'.
He continued : 'War has become total. And war has become absurd' (Mills 1959: 9, 12); absurd because massive preparations are being made for a war without a conception of victory. Both commentators therefore warned of the imminence of nuclear destruction from the lack of rational control over strategy. In fiction, both Aldous Huxley [Ape and Essence) and James Blish (Black Easter, 1968) explain nuclear war as proving mankind's 'worship of unreason'. By contrast Herman Wouk's satire The 'Lomokome Papers (1968) gives a fragmentary narrative (edited by a military officer who dismisses the contents as pure 'fiction') of an astronaut's contacts with intelligent beings on the Moon who are waging a 'reasonable war'; the two nations each observe a regular Death Day when a set number of citizens are put to death thereby avoiding unnecessary conflict. (1)
These narratives gain their force by masking their subjects behind a facade of reasonableness which must be penetrated by the reader. Similar apparently skewed priorities inform the cartoons of Jules Feiffer which helped to establish a vogue in the late fifties for sick jokes, among which were sketches of the promotion of nuclear technology to the public by official agencies. One series (in Sick, Sick, Sick, 1959) shows a sales director or government official (the point is that the roles have become indistinguishable) insisting that the public should be made 'positive fallout conscious' and that this can be done by having a 'Mr. and Mrs. Mutation' contest. The fear addressed by Poul Anderson and others (see Chapter 4) is here turned on its head into a grotesque prize quality. Again Feiffer's narrative 'Boom!' (Passionella, 1959) describes the growing atmospheric pollution from nuclear tests. To quieten fears a government-hired PR firm erects bill-boards declaring that 'Big Black Floating Specks Are Good For You!'
Feiffer describes the selling of the bomb to the public. Gina Berriault's 1961 novel The Descent also satirises the commercial promotion of nuclear shelters. Set in I lie imminent future (1964), the novel describes the appointment of an obscure Iowa professor to the post of Secretary for Humanity. This is essentially a PR post designed by the us government to stifle the 'non-realists', i.e. anyone who doesn't accept the official line on defence. Berriault demonstrates how nuclear issues have become institutionalised within the culture. Cities compete for who has the best nuclear shelters, an anti-radiation pill called NIX-R is being promoted, and Miss Massive Retaliation (voted in by us Armed Forces Overseas) sings a song whose refrain appears as this chapter's epigraph in Tokyo shortly before a Hiroshima memorial ceremony. The descent of the title is an entry into a massive shelter under Denver which has become a bizarre tourist attraction, and here Berriault, like Mordecai Roshwald in Level 7, plays on the metaphorical implications of descent and its opposite.
An evangelist, parodically echoing Norman Vincent Peale who had been arguing since the late 1940s that the cure for nuclear fear was to think positively, declares ringingly: 'Man's descent into the bowels of the earth shall be known as the great descent that was the ascent. Let this Nuclear Era then be known as the Age of Ascent' (Berriault 1961: 111). This disguise of an action as its opposite is symptomatic of a nationwide government orchestrated process where Cold War policies are commodified and foisted on a gullible public.
Running throughout these works is a denial of death, an attempted diminution of nuclear holocaust. Mordecai Roshwald's A Small Armageddon (1962, inspired by the Peter Sellers farce The Mouse That Roared) makes this process explicit in its very title. An American nuclear submarine crew use their warheads to blackmail the President into supplying them with money, drink and professional strippers. Then in the second plot an airforce commander sets out on a 'Nuclear Crusade' against the 'seat of godless power' in Moscow.
Both sequences resemble Dr. Strangelove in starting with bizarre acts of rebellion within the us military. In the event both rebels destroy each other and so total holocaust is avoided. Armageddon recedes too in Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle (1963) where the narrator plans to write a book about the day of the Hiroshima bombing (The Day the World Ended). As his subject eludes him he begins to suspect that he is retracing a megalomaniacal apocalyptic script like Roshwald's airforce commander, and his account is never completed (cf. Zins 1986). The comic treatment of fears of extinction and mutation exemplify how black humour feigns to deprioritise subjects presumed lo carry weight. It was the ultimate subject, of nuclear holocaust which received comic treatment in the masterpiece of Cold War absurdism. Dr. Strangelove. It is no coincidence that
Joseph Heller, whose Catch-22 superimposed fifties paranoia on a late-World War II setting, should have been approached to write the screenplay for this film. (2)
(II)
As early as 1946 Chandler Davis had published a story ('To Still the Drums') on the dangers of a military clique taking the USA into war. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried unsuccessfully to persuade Truman to turn over to them control of nuclear weapons, and the following year Heinlein published an account ('The Long Watch') of a renegade military officer on a lunar base who also tries to threaten the Earth into submission with atomic bombs. With the accession of Kennedy relations between the military and the White House deteriorated so markedly that Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey could describe an attempted military coup in their 1962 novel Seven Days in May.
Dr. Strangelove belongs within a cluster of novels dealing with nuclear crises triggered by a despairing us general (Peter George, Two Hours to Doom, 1958), a component fault in the SAC computer (Burdick and Wheeler's Fail-Safe, 1962), and a deranged Soviet general (George O. Smith's Doomsday Wing, 1963).3 George's novel describes the decision by a SAC general to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union from his desperation at the latter's remorseless gains during the Cold War. General Quinten's actions bring the world to the brink of war, but the crisis passes when the one us bomber which penetrates the Soviet Union drops its bomb harmlessly in an uninhabited area. Strangelove follows the same scenario whose initiator this time is a manic paranoid, but takes us up to the brink and over it.
When Stanley Kubrick started work on the screenplay for Strangelove is original intention was to produce a serious adaptation of George's novel. Then, by his own account, he ran up against a difficulty: in filling out scenes 'one had to keep leaving things out of it which were either absurd or paradoxical, in order to keep it from being funny, and these things seemed to be very real' (Kubrick 1963: 12). This blocked his true sense of a subject: 'After all, what could be more absurd than the very idea of two mega-powers willing to wipe out all human life because of an accident, spiced up by political differences that will seem as meaningless to people a hundred years from now as the theological conflicts of the Middle Ages appear to us today?' (Gelmis 1971: 309). Accordingly he chose a method of 'nightmare comedy', bringing Terry Southern in to work on the script and presumably also the novel.
The novel, published in 1963 shortly before the film's release, captures the black humour of the film, but with differences of scene-arrangement. Where the latter opens with a voice over describing a secret military establishment in Russia, the novel introduces its narrative with a science fiction frame which warns against generic expectations of war fiction, distances the reader, reduces nuclear weapons to 'toys', and questions superpower rivalry: 'They were not on friendly terms, and we find this difficult to understand, because both were governed by power systems which seem to us basically similar' (George 1979: 1).
From the same period Alfred Bermel's 'The End of the Race' (1964) uses the same device of a detached, rather bemused observer from another galaxy in opening: 'At that time the nations known as America and Russia had set off 2,500 nuclear explosions, pulverised every small island in the Pacific, Arctic and Indian Oceans, blown out of the earth lumps of great magnitude and little mineralogical value' (Pohl 1965: 77). Robert Sheckley's Journey beyond Tomorrow (1962) similarly describes from a far-future viewpoint the 'spontaneous and chaotic explosion of warfare' triggered by a civilian jet in Californian airspace. The ensuing 'great war' is so widespread that the 'Old World ... perished as completely as though it had never been' (Sheckley 1987: 180). All three narratives estrange the reader by refusing kinship with a lower species bent on self-destruction.
Strangelove shows a process running under its own momentum where the loss of communication only emphasises the helplessness of the human agents. Kubrick has pointed out that 'most of the humor in Strangelove arises from the depiction of everyday human behaviour in a nightmarish situation' (Gelmis 1971: 309). Whereas in Two Hours and Fail-Safe the hot line performs an important function in bringing the leaders of the superpowers together, one of the many ironies of Strangelove is that the military machines function only too well whereas the means of communication constantly break down (Maland 1979: 712). At one critical point Mandrake has no coins to phone the recall codes to Washington; at another the President can only locate the Soviet premier through Omsk Information.
(4)
The cross-cutting between scenes (the novel has approximately double the number of the film) strengthens the suggestion of loss of communication by showing how each key location (Ripper's office, the main bomber, War Room) is sealed from the others. The traditional interaction between command centre and bombers in World War II narratives Is blocked off, although traces are retained of earlier wars in anachronistic statements like General Ripper's declaration that 'it looks like we're in a shooting war', and in the use of handheld cameras for the assault on Burpelson base as if it were combat footage. There is a collective refusal by the military to recognise the paradigm shift that nuclear weapons necessitate. (5) The mismatch between sound-track and image strengthens this irony by playing 'When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again' or Vera Lynn's 'We'll Meet Again' over repeated nuclear explosions (Broderick 1992: 69). The whole point is that there will be no 'again'. In the meantime characters continue to play out Cold War rivalries diminished to a squabble like that which erupts between the Soviet ambassador and General Turgidson on the floor of the War Room.
While Generals Ripper and Turgidson personify a hawkish wing of the military, they also parody the cigar-chomping Curtis Lemay, the SAC commander who was a leading proponent of the Joint Chiefs' war plan kept secret from the Kennedy administration. (6) When General Turgidson is proposing a pre-emptive strike a nearby file reads 'world targets in megadeaths', a clear allusion to the government adviser who did most to popularise thinking about the unthinkable, Herman Kahn.
The latter's massive study On Thermonuclear War (1960) not only explains the feasibility of the Doomsday Machine which concludes Strangelove but also describes with chilling objectivity the massive casualty figures which would result from any nuclear exchange. This sort of nuclear calculation is embodied in the figure of Dr. Strangelove whose entrance in the film is delayed until the Doomsday Machine is mentioned, thereby associating him with death as he wheels forward out of the shadows. (7)
Strangelove is in fact a composite figure also signifying the continuity between Nazi and American military experimentation (cf. the rocket technician Wernher von Braun) as well as the scientific rationalism floating free of consequences parodied in Bermel and James Blish, in whose novel The Day after Judgement (1971) an ex-RAND Corporation official invokes Kahn's 'ladder of escalation' to assess the destruction after a nuclear war. Insulated from the wasteland outside, he argues heatedly in an underground bunker for the benefits of different nuclear weapons, insisting that 'a selenium bomb is essentially a humane bomb' because of its short half-life (Blish 1981: 128). The most sustained satire on Kahn's analytical method is Leonard C. Lewin's Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace (1967). This fictitious report, prepared by a government think-tank in a secret under¬ground nuclear facility, reverses the conventional relation of war to peace, presenting the former as a norm and the latter a danger.
Drawing on the arguments of works like Fred J. Cook's Warfare
State (1963), Iron Mountain imitates Kahn's practice of tabulating options in its 'Disarmament Scenarios' and concludes that 'war itself is the basic social system' (Lewin 1968: 61). Throughout its deadpan Swiftian proposals Iron Mountain maintains a facade of plausibility by quoting contemporary commentators, prominent among them Kahn himself.
(III)
While the surface disjunctions of Strangelove have their satirical role, there is a subtext to this narrative which diagnoses a neurosis at the heart of the military establishment. To locate this we need to
backtrack to the earliest accounts of nuclear explosions given by the journalist William L. Laurence who for a time enjoyed a virtual monopoly of such reportage. He describes the 1945 Alamagordo blast as producing a 'giant column ... quivering convulsively' as it penetrated low cloud 'like a vibrant volcano spouting fire to the
sky' (Laurence 1961: 117). Then the Nagasaki bomb produces a 'giant pillar of purple fire' once again climbing through the clouds whereupon 'there came shooting out of the top a giant mushroom' (Laurence 1961: 159). Laurence's metaphors of male orgasm and birthing have been explained by feminist scholars as attempts at
maximising male technological creativity (Cohn 1987: 699-701) and identifying female sexuality with the bomb's destructiveness (Caputi 1991: 430).
Ira Chernus's Dr. Strangelove (1986) pays tribute to the importance of Strangelove in its title and demonstrates a congruence between nuclear weaponry and apocalyptic motifs, arguing that the Bomb is a 'symbol of omnipotence' producing extreme ambivalence (Chernus 1986: 92, 100). In Strangelove it is General Jack D. Ripper whose conspiracy theory proves so ludicrous that it invites the reader/viewer to scrutinise the narrative for other possible signs of neurosis. He explains to the bemused Mandrake that he has 'studied the facts' and concluded that the fluoridation of water is the 'most monstrously conceived and dangerous communist plot we have ever had to face' (George 1979: 78).
Ripper continues: 'A foreign substance is introduced into the precious bodily fluids, without the knowledge of the individual and certainly without any free choice. That's the way the commies work ...' (George 1979: 79). Conflating hatred of welfare With fear of Communism, Ripper identifies the fate of his body with that of the nation, then merges the Communist threat with that of a female sexual contact to justify a retention neurosis. Ripper expounds his 'theory' during the battle for his air base. Rearing a heavy machine gun as a substitute phallus, he blasts away through his office window. However, once his men surrender, the gun droops, his cigar goes out (becomes 'dead'), and he takes his life with a pistol.
Ripper's obsession helps to strengthen a set of linkages between military technology and sexuality whereby the exercise of power shifts symbolically between the two domains. This was first recognised by F. Anthony Macklin who earned Kubrick's approval by describing the film as a 'sex allegory', 'from foreplay to explosion in the mechanised world' (Macklin 1965: 55). Macklin argues that this sequence can be observed particularly clearly in the flight of Leper Colony as its commander 'King' Kong progresses from 'reading' Playboy, through arming the bombs (which then become 'potent') to the orgasmic launch of the bombs one of which is ridden by Kong to his death. Norman Kagan has further fleshed out this reading, adding more glosses on characters' names and pointing out that the B-52 bomber is itself 'phallic, particularly in its indefatigable race to coitus' (Kagan 1972: 137).
Strangelove foregrounds sexual imagery from the first scene, a mid-air fuelling sequence taken out of context from Strategic Air Command (1955) so that it resembles two gigantic metal insects copulating. Kong sees 'Miss Foreign Affairs' on the centre-fold of his Playboy who soon reappears as General Buck Turgidson's secretary 'catching up on paper work' in a hotel suite sprawled under a sun-lamp, in a bikini, named after the Pacific atoll used for H-bomb tests. The scene between Turgidson and his secretary concludes with him telling her: 'You start your count down right now and old Buckie will be back before you can say re-entry' (George 1979: 25).
The concluding ribald pun (the film uses the more decorous 'blastoff') relates sexual activity to the operation of nuclear weaponry. The comedy of Strangelove is ultimately about death, and destruction turns out to be the ultimate aphrodisiac. When the bombers head for the Soviet Union, Dr. Strangelove's eyes gleam with excitement and Turgidson becomes 'almost feverish'. General Ripper functions in the narrative not only as a trigger to the action but also as a particular instance of a general pathology.
In an article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (to which Kubrick had a regular subscription) Mortimer Ostow speculated on the implications of Freud's death-wish for war, suggesting that it might be subject to 'discharge pressure' like Eros. He continued: 'In the case of some of the more aggressive and bold leaders of the past, it is likely that their belligerence served to deflect their inward directed death impulses to the outer world' (Ostow 1963: 27).
Here we encounter the central reversal that lies at the heart of Strangelove. Where earlier novels and films depicted the army as the nation's protector, they are now shown to be driven by lust for destruction which turns American against American and which ultimately leads to the demise of the nation. Lewis Mumford enthusiastically praised the film for its depiction of 'colossal paranoids and criminal incompetents' as being the 'only way possible to characterise the policy itself (Mumford 1964: 8). The whole point about Ripper, Turgidson and others is that they are not exceptions within the system. Two voices articulate reason but they are both outsiders to the American military: Mandrake, the seconded RAF officer who manages to find the bombers' recall code; and the President Merkin Muffley whose name makes a ribald contrast between female pubic hair and the President's baldness. From the perspective of the military hawks his very moderation (modelled in style and appearance on Adlai Stevenson) feminises him; but it is his rationality not the action of the military, based on the dangerously irrelevant scripts of movie roles, which almost saves the situation.
Almost, but not quite.
The climax of Strangelove realises the rumours in the film's opening scene of the Soviet Union building an 'ultimate weapon, a doomsday device'. The latter concept, as we saw in Chapter 3, was popularised but not originated by Herman Kahn whose description is closely followed in this narrative: the use of cobalt-coated megabombs buried deep in a mountain range triggered by computer (see Kahn 1961: 145).
The detonation of the device (ultimately uncontrollable) brings not tragedy since the President's queries about the fate of the population are drowned out by the possibility of a surviving remnant (men, of course) who would descend into mineshafts with women 'selected for their sexual characteristics' (George 1979: 144). At this point in the film Strangelove's prosthetic right arm springs erect in a multiple sign of a Nazi salute, displaced penis, and (pace Bernard Wolfe) aggression; the Cold War will continue, if only as a race to avoid a 'mine-shaft gap'. It is this ending, this 'strange love', which functions as a prelude to Suzy McKee Charnas's Walk to the End of the World (1974) which describes a post-holocaust world where the nuclear shelters have become the site for a gendered play of power. After the 'Wasting' the men project their guilt on to their women, reinventing an enemy-as-scapegoat, and reducing the women to slaves. (8)
(IV)
The absurdist mode of Strangelove has been used in a number of subsequent narratives of nuclear war. Norman Spinrad's 'The Big Flash' (1969) has a countdown sequence to describe the rise of the new Californian pop group, the Four Horsemen. Their performances use sound and image to induce a pre-verbal desire for death, building up to an orgasmic climax with the sound of an explosion and - like the finale to Strangelove - slow-motion shots of nuclear blasts. Political despair is given an apocalyptic packaging which both uses and becomes spectacle; each performance contains news footage of burning Vietnamese villages, inner-city riots and similar scenes. The group's chants orchestrate a deathwish phrased as a yearning for escape: 'before we die let's dig that high that frees us from our binds ... the last big flash, mankind's last gasp' (Miller and Greenberg 1987: 56).
Again as in Strangelove, language proves unavailable for rational control of the impulse to die which Spinrad demonstrates through the moment before apocalypse where characters feel to be on the verge of revelation as they chant 'DO IT! DO IT!' The popularity of the group increases public support for nuclear weapons and even leads to the detonation of a device at one of their concerts. Their televised performance vicariously arouses a missile silo crew ('my own key was throbbing in my hand alive' [Miller and Greenberg 1987: 63]) to the point of launch. Spinrad's extension of the countdown into the social context works well since the story demonstrates a circulation of images of destruction from the military through the news and then pop media back to the military. In that sense 'The Big Flash' paints an even bleaker picture than Strangelove since society as a whole falls prey to the contagious lust for destruction.
Complicity too is the main issue in James Morrow's This is the Way the World Ends (1986) which one review declared 'begins where Dr. Strangelove ends'. (9) This future-war novel frames its main narrative with a predictive section where Nostradamus foresees a 'conflagration of human design' (Morrow 1989: 7). Morrow uses mock-picaresque chapter titles to flag in advance the experiences of 'our hero', a New England gravestone mason who buys his daughter an anti-radiation suit shortly before war breaks out. The sales contract is the main document of the novel since in it Paxton admits recognition that the suits encourage American 'society's leaders to pursue a policy of nuclear brinkmanship' (Morrow 1989: 45).
When the bombs drop, Paxton is half-blinded, shot and then carried off in a us nuclear submarine whose crew assume he is a member of the designated survivors elite (the 'Erebus' plan). Intermittent realism is used by Morrow to springboard the reader into temporary fantasy realms to capture the lunacy of nuclear confrontation. Thus Paxton buys his radiation suit from the MAD Hatter, otherwise known as the 'Tailor of Thermonuclear Terror'. Playing on the notorious policy acronym for Mutual Assured Destruction, Morrow depicts a surreal figure who combines the multiple roles of salesman, diplomat, manic chorus and even the weaver of humanity's fate. He is also the first in a series of figures to pass through the novel from Alice in Wonderland, reflecting an evident conviction by Morrow that the nuclear issue can only be dramatised through fantastic means.
Paxton accordingly is carried from life to death on a rite of passage where he is shown the destruction by fire of America, this last then rendered in narrative as an inset anti-scripture on the text 'In the ending Humankind destroyed the heaven and the earth' (Morrow 1989: 115). The culmination of Paxton's journey comes in Antarctica, the location of the Necropolis of History, an overgrown marble city like a vast monument surcharged with pathos by the impending death of the future. When Paxton and others query the sanity of events the Hatter points the moral of discredited rationality, screaming : 'They called the Joint Chiefs of Staff sane! They called the National Security Council sane!' (Morrow 1989: 125). Morrow acts on such declarations by denying Paxton (and the reader) a stable level of reality within the narrative; there is no area of his subjectivity exempt from the moral impact of nuclear war. Events shade into dream, but never at the expense of ongoing debate over the war, defence policy, or survivors' guilt. The concluding section describes the trial of the survivors by the 'unadmitted', what Jonathan Schell calls the future generations 'cancelled' by nuclear war. Paxton has by this point become the 'prisoner of the murdered future', alive but sterile. (10)
These chapters interrogate the whole situation of nuclear confrontation, like Leo Szilard's 'My Trial as a War Criminal' drawing comparisons with the Nuremberg hearings. Speaking with the viewpoint of history Justice Jefferson pronounces as final verdict the judgement: 'Each of you in his own way encouraged his government to cultivate a technology of mass murder, and, by extension, each of you supported a policy of mass murder' (Morrow 1989: 218). Paxton is of course an adult and therefore denied the buttressing of Alice's childhood innocence. Both Spinrad and Morrow implicate their protagonists and by extension their readers in the contagion of deathlust or in acquiescence to .1 culture of mass destruction. The next chapter will examine two narratives which investigate the cultural narratives Leading to that destruction after nuclear holocaust has occurred.
Notes
1. In 1957 Heinlein was offered the chance to write a screenplay for Work's novel, which he refused on the grounds that the book was a 'philosophical tract packaged as a fantasy' (Heinlein 1989: 116).
2. MS note from Stanley Kubrick to Heller, 30 July 1962, Heller Archive, Brandeis University.
3. The US edition of George's novel was retitled Red Alert, and the book was praised by Herman Kahn as a clever presentation of an 'ominous possibility' (Kahn 1962: 44) see Abrash 1986 for a discussion of the hidden logic within deterrence in this novel and Roshwald's Level 7. George dedicated his second nuclear novel, Commander-1 (1965), to Kubrick. For commentary on Fail-Safe and the preventive system of its title see Seed 1994b. The scenario of a madman launching a weapon against the Soviet Union is described in Andrew Sinclair's The Project (1960).
4. The treatment of the telephone is not mere fantasy. At that time the us military depended on public lines for their communication; and when Kennedy moved into the White House the hot line was disconnected and removed during redecoration (Ford 1986: 28-9).
5. Cf. Brustein 1964: 4, and John W. Campbell: 'All our former concepts of strategy and tactics must be thrown out and an entirely new order of things instituted' (Campbell 1947: 243).
6. J. K. Galbraith described Lemay as 'the most prominent figure in the culture of destruction' ('Timewatch', BBC2, 8 October 1996).
7. Charles Maland sees in him elements of Edward Teller and Henry Kissinger as well as Kahn (Maland 1979: 709-10). The subtitle combines Norman Vincent Peale with an article by Leo Szilard: 'How to Live with the Bomb and Survive' [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [February 1960]).
8. Charnas has explained that her novel was provoked by an article about an underground nuclear command facility for the us government which suggested that the 'very cretins who cause the destruction of the world [would be there] with lots of nubile young women' (Charnas 1998: 6). The 'mine-shaft gap' parodies the misperception of a 'missile gap' in favour of the Soviets which played a role in the 1960 presidential campaign.
9. The Philadelphia Enquirer, quoted in the fly-leaf of the 1989 reprint. A Strangelove figure named Dr. Randstable is among those tried for war crimes.
10. Cf. Schell 1982: 168: 'Of all the crimes against the future, extinction is the greatest. It is the murder of the future'.
In: American Science Fiction and the Cold War: Literature and Film. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2006), pp. 145-156.
The technological imagination from the early Romanticism through the historical Avant-Gardes to the Classical Space Age and beyond
quinta-feira, 24 de maio de 2012
segunda-feira, 21 de maio de 2012
Joseph Beuys: Everydayness, Allegory and the Avant-garde: Some Reflections on the Work of Joseph Beuys by Peter Bürger
The aporias of either-or
Unrestricted quotation, allegory without reference, the independence of the signifier and the dissolution of art into a completely aestheticized everydayness: all these attempts to define the nature of the post-modern have one thing in common. They all assert the levelling down of oppositions which had remained valid ones for the modern age. This process must not be confused with the dialectical one known as 'sublation' ('Aufhebung'): the oppositions here are not 'sublated' in a third term but are rather eliminated as such in so far as one of the two terms in question drops out altogether.
If a quotation no longer makes a specifically determinate reference to the work from which it has been taken but rather by virtue of vague allusion to the themes or techniques of another author or even epoch actually determines an image or text in its entirety, then the opposition between text and quotation disappears. The image is a quotation - but it no longer quotes anything determinate, for in order to do so it would have to construct a context against which that which is quoted could stand out in relief.
The appeal to allegory, which does not link the individual elements of a work symbolically according to an organic principle but in accordance with the principle of 'meaning', became important for the aesthetics of modernity because it enabled the artist to escape the confines of idealist aesthetics which had forced us to conceive of form and content in art according to the metaphysical schema of subject and object. But when under the sign of post-modernist thought the meaning which connects the parts is not merely loosened but actually revoked, then all that remains of allegory is a heap of fragments and unconnected signs. And when the signifier is no longer tied to the signified, then reference is replaced by movement through an infinite chain of signifiers. When, finally, art is dissolved into an aestheticized everyday world, art can no longer be perceived as a specific domain at all.
In so far as the kind of post-modernist discourse outlined here still makes any theoretical claims, it is susceptible to an immanent critique. We expect a theory to be able to explain the conditions of its own possibility either systematically or historically. Post-modernist discourse is not in a position to do so. There is a drawing by the Italian artist Clemente which depicts two figures running past one another in opposite directions, each of them holding on to one of the sides of a ring that bears the inscription 'symbolon'. Just as this programmatic drawing, which asserts the fragmentation of the sign, can only be understood as long as we suppose a semiotic system that remains intact, so too all post-modernist talk about the indepen¬dence of the signifier does indeed employ a semiotic system that recognizes the opposition of signifier and signified. Post-modernist discourse is not only unable to identify the position from which it speaks, it demonstrates precisely its own impossibility. (1)
One might expect that any discourse the groundlessness of which has been exposed by immanent critique is thereby already disposed of. But this is not the case. In fact the fascination with post-modernist discourse persists. It must therefore draw its compelling power from sources other than internal consistency. In this connection it is tempting to think of the catastrophic aura that hangs over the world-historical horizon of the present age. Where the very survival of human life is put in question, the category of meaning also becomes questionable. Certainly this is not sufficient by itself to explain the collapse of our system of signs but it lets us glimpse the experiential context of a mode of thought which in the face of the, unthinkable is no longer prepared to bow to the force of rational argument.
Reflections of this kind can render two aspects of the problem intelligible: on the one hand the fascination which such thinking exercises upon us, on the other hand the great lack of understanding; which prevails between the post-modernist thinkers and their critics, The conclusions which can be drawn from this situation touch upon; the limits of the kind of thought which views everything within the fixed perspective of catastrophe. After we have admitted the debilitation of rational argument produced by the historical situation, we will have to return to such argument once again because it seems to offer us the only means of clarifying our situation.
If we attempt to grasp post-modernist thought not as a stringent theory but as the expression of an epochal predicament, then it has to be taken seriously as such. This does not mean that we must accept it in all the abundance of its very different forms. On the contrary we can take up quite different positions with respect to these various forms:
1. Certainly the simplest is the happy hedonism of 'anything goes'. Particularly in the aesthetic field this is a view strongly suggested by the prevailing state of affairs. The coexistence of so many different artistic movements will then appear as a legitimate expression of pluralism, from which anyone can draw what suits their purposes, and the confusion of quotations from the most diverse contexts combined in a single work as an ironic playing with tradition.
2. Anyone who suspects such a simple endorsement of the post-modern predicament in which all variety is treated as equivalent and spread out before us in a single dimension, can find a more subtle form of endorsement with a Nietzschean gesture that affirms a radical rupture. Anyone taking this line can criticize the false riches of post-modern multiplicity initially in order then to reach a position of non-participation through a (fictive) leap out of their own time, a position which would allow them to take positive possession of what was criticized before. What formerly presented itself as a purely arbitrary choice now becomes the product of an act on the part of the subject, an act of 'neutralization'. (2)
3. If on the other hand we understand the post-modern situation as one in which the multiplicity of historical models that are indiscriminately appropriated for our purposes merely obscures the lack of work valid for our own age (in other words as a situation of historicism and eclecticism), then we cannot avoid enquiring after a standard, something which strict modernism found in the concept of advanced material. And here there are two paths we can take: either we pursue the question whether even in the post-modern age advanced artistic material in Adorno's sense can still be identified (cf. Kilb's contribution to this problem), or we attempt to understand the causes which have led to an uncertainty concerning aesthetic standards, if not to their disappearance altogether (cf. the contributions of Berman and Feher).(3) Both these paths are viable but they are not without certain risks of their own.
The danger inherent in the first approach lies in reproducing Adorno's decisionism. If it is true that the artistic developments of the 1970s and 1980s have rendered his position untenable and furthermore have opened our eyes to everything that Adorno was driven to exclude from the domain of valid works of art in order to hold fast to his rigorous concept of modernism, then we have to ask whether it is desirable to try and renew this concept.
Furthermore we should bear in mind that the concept of advanced artistic material presupposes a logic of material development which can certainly be verified for particular artistic domains in narrowly defined periods (as in the development of cubism prior to 1914 for example) but which cannot be regarded as possessing a uniform character, even during the periods of classical modernism (Kandinsky and the cubists do not follow the same logic of the material, not to mention the surrealists).
Of course the way in which Kilb opposes his 'one thing only goes' to the 'anything goes' approach is impressive: the play of empty allegorical references. But it seems to me that this does not really help us to get a conceptual grasp upon the very different types of authentic artistic achievement in the present, neither Peter Weiss's Ästhetik des Widerstands, nor the work/non-work of Joseph Beuys, for example, and this despite the fact that the latter does pursue specifically allegorical intentions. Whereas a systematic critique of post-modernist discourse seeks to identify its contradictions, a historically oriented critique enquires into its origins. In relation to the realm of aesthetic products the question becomes the following: how have we come to give up that separation established in modernity between the work of art as the centre of interest on the one side and the everyday world and trivial art on the other, and along with that the strict modernist concept of form, in favour of an uninhibited eclecticism and a tendency towards ubiqui¬tous quotation?
If criticism seeks a guilty party in this process, it will be able to discover it in the historical avant-garde movements of the past. For these movements in fact attempted to eliminate the distinction between art and the practice of everyday life and to loosen up the relationship with trivial art and indeed also succeeded in putting in question the rigorous modernist concept of form (through the idea of écriture automatique, for example). Nevertheless, the assignment of guilt attempted in this connection by Berman remains a questionable undertaking. The universal aestheticization of American everyday life which he describes so convincingly more probably results from the imperatives of capitalist commodity production, or more precisely from the compulsion to perpetuate a consumer stimulus, than from the (however misdirected) project of a particular artistic group. Is not Berman here adopting a conservative model of cultural criticism which 'transposes the unpleasant costs resulting from a more or less successful process of capitalist modernization to modern culture itself [in this case the avant-garde movement]?'(4)
Now Berman is not alone in this critique of the avant-garde, formulated as it is under the impact of post-modernism. Ferenc Fehér's argumentation also tends in this direction, (5) and Jürgen Habermas, who decisively rejects the aesthetic anti-modernism of Daniel Bell, also clearly takes up a position against the avant-garde movements. Habermas perceives serious dangers for society in the avant-garde's attempt to 'de-differentiate' the different cultural spheres.
For Habermas the differentiation of the spheres of science, morality and art in fact represents a historical progress and he suspects the attempt to question this differentiation of powers as a regressive wish. However, it can hardly be denied that the insulation which obtains between the individual cultural spheres is one serious problem in our culture. The uncoupling of politics from morality certainly represented a progressive development in the time of Hobbes but it becomes very probematic in an age when the technical potential for destruction has grown to such a degree that all human life can be wiped off the face of the earth. (6) And similar considerations apply to the uncoupling of science from morality as well.
It is precisely the success of science (in the field of genetic engineering, for example) which now makes it imperative for us to bring science back once again into a productive relationship with morality. As far as art is concerned, the pursuit of what one could call the obstinate autonomy of the aesthetic simultaneously represents both an advance and a loss of those dimensions which only become available to art if it ventures out of the secure domain of the aesthetic that has been allotted to it.
These remarks are intended to suggest that we should not simply account the aforementioned separation of domains as a case of historical progress. It is not merely reconnecting the results obtained by a culture of 'experts' back to the life-world that represents a major cultural problem for our society but also and above all the separation of the spheres as such. And it is a merit of the avant-garde movements to have exposed this problem, quite independently of the question whether the solutions they proposed have actually proved feasible or not.
It is perhaps here that we encounter the limits of an approach that tries to impose upon us a dichotomous schema of either-or. Thus either the separation of cultural domains represents historical progress, in which case it is to be accepted and the consequent problems dealt with as they arise (like that of 'reconnecting' with the life-world, for example); or it represents an evil, in which case we must strive to eliminate it and face up to the regressive consequences of this project. Either we accept art as an autonomous institution, in which case any attempt to go beyond this situation must be denounced as a false transcendence; or we adopt the avant-garde position, in which case we must in all consequence also propose the abolition of museums and theatres. Either we cling to the possibility of aesthetic evaluation, in which case we affirm the concept of advanced material even against our better historical judgement; or we accept the free utilization of any material and thus renounce all attempts to evaluate the aesthetic object.
As formulated here, these dichotomies might seem to suggest a decision in favour of the first alternative in each case. But since we have already seen that this option is burdened with specific problems of its own, we should ask ourselves whether the formulation of these alternatives in terms of an either-or decision might not be the very problem. Not merely because on closer examination we recognize that the 'or' position offered to us is such an unattractive alternative that it cannot possibly be accepted but because the dichotomous schema might not in fact do justice to the facts themselves.
Instead of trying to isolate the avant-garde impulse, we should ask ourselves whether it might contain a potential which could still be developed, if art is to be more than an institution that compensates for problems arising from the process of social modernization. Without that diabolical element in the avant-garde impulse towards the transcendence of art as an institution the art of the post-modern age might well rapidly degenerate into a kind of salon art without the salon. Theory is unable to produce by itself an answer to the question whether there is a third position that could release us from the compulsive logic of either-or (which in truth compels us to opt for the 'either'). Theory can recognize what has come to pass historically but cannot lay down what shall be.
Consequently I shall conclude the theoretical discussion here and turn instead to an analysis of certain aspects of the work of Joseph Beuys, a prototypical representative of the avant-garde artist in the period after the end of the historical avant-garde movement. But I would not like the following analysis to be misinterpreted simply as an exposition of a theoretical problem which could equally well be presented with reference to some other artist. Beuys cannot be regarded as a test case and that is precisely what makes him relevant for theoretical reflection. The internal break in my argument recognizes the heteronomy of theory. If the latter understands anything, it can only do so by reference to the things themselves.
The transgressor
No one can doubt that Beuys belongs in the tradition of the historical avant-garde movement. He has stressed as much himself in the speech he delivered on receiving the Lehmbruck prize. There he tells us that he is concerned with 'a basic idea for the renewal of the social whole, one which leads in the direction of social sculpture'. (7) He takes up the Utopian project of the historical avant-garde which was once formulated by Breton as the creation of a world which men could finally live in ('un monde enfin habitable'). But Beuys also knows that the avant-garde movement was unable to realize this project and that he too will not be able to realize it. All that remains is to 'pass on the flame'. (8)
I have spoken about the failure of the historical avant-garde movement myself in my Theory of the Avant-garde. And if one compares the project with what became of it, this talk of failure is certainly apposite. But such a judgement itself remains caught within the logic of the either-or. If we leave this logic behind, it seems questionable whether a Utopian project can ever fail since it is so intimately connected with that hope that can never be disappointed, according to the dictum of Ernst Bloch. We can also express this idea in another way: failure is the mode in which the avant-garde artist reaffirms the Utopian quality of the project, a project that would always be transformed into something else if it were to be realized.
Dadaism and early surrealism were sustained by the hope that the hidden potential for creativity and imagination could be released simply by destroying art as an autonomous institution separated from the practice of real life. Hence that assault upon institutional art the shrill vehemence of which will never be equalled again. Now there is hardly a trace of all this in Beuys. It is certainly true that he distances himself from the concept of the artist, 'which is just what I do not wish to be.' (9) But this distancing gesture lacks the polemical edge which characterized the dadaist declarations. Whereas Raoul Hausmann spits at Goethe, Beuys can actually appeal to him as a writer who entertained a concept of science different from the dominant one of his time and as a man who pursued both art and science in exactly the same spirit. Instead of a direct attack upon art as an institution, what we see here is a movement which leads us away from art without completely abandoning it in the process.
'I actually have nothing to do with art - and this is the only possibility which permits us to do something for art.' (10) This paradoxical formulation captures a situation in which artistic achievement becomes dependent upon the capacity of the artist to transgress the institutional limits of art. Since what we have accustomed ourselves to calling the failure of the historical avant-garde movement the original impulse to transcend art has been transformed: it now knows that it is dependent upon what it rejects.
In fact Beuys wishes to produce a change in our attitudes, to establish a new relationship towards our own senses and the materials with which they come into contact, as well as towards the realm of thought and that which transcends the sensuous. But since the era of aestheticism the idea of transforming our modes of perception has become an empty cliche devoid of any experiential significance. Consequently, Beuys can no longer pursue his aims within the institutional context of art. On the other hand he cannot simply abandon the latter if he does not wish to repeat the avant-garde assault upon it. So it is that he becomes a transgressor who simultaneously transposes the borderlines that he constantly violates now from this direction and now from that. When one of his conversation partners tentatively described his drawings as 'a particular kind of exploration', Beuys agreed but immediately went on to add: 'Nevertheless I have not let myself lose sight of art altogether. Art as such is what I wanted to achieve. We have not yet achieved it.' (11) The paradox that we still have no art ('for it does not yet exist') only makes sense if we presuppose a concept of art quite different from the traditional one, a new 'totalized' concept of art as Beuys describes it. 'All human questions can only be questions of shaping and that is what I mean by the totalised concept of art. The concept refers to the possibility that everyone can in principle be a creative being as well as to questions concerning society as a whole.' (12)
Beuys has a peculiar way of using concepts which we could describe as a kind of semantic displacement. He certainly employs traditional terms but he transposes the semantic core of these concepts by bringing them into close proximity with a number of quite different ones which he also displaces in turn. Thus he transposes the concept of art by bringing it into a close relationship with that of science, but he differentiates the latter from the currently prevailing concept of science and defines it without regard to any methodological features. On another occasion the concept of art is transposed into an all-encompassing idea of 'shaping' which is not, on the other hand, supposed to exhaust the content of the concept. For, as a counterpart to this extension of meaning, Beuys still clings to the idea of a specifically artistic form of activity and speaks of 'social sculpture' in this connection.
It is quite pointless to accuse Beuys of being logically inconsistent in his use of language here. On the contrary we must understand these inconsistencies as an appropriate expression of the fact that Beuys is working from an impossible position - one that is located neither inside nor outside of art as an institution but on a borderline that he constantly negates at the same time.
Material allegory
Beuys introduced two new materials into the domain of plastic art: fat and felt. His employment of these materials goes back to a traumatic experience of his own but their significance is not exhausted by the allusion they make to that experience. In 1943 Beuys's fighter plane crashed in the Crimea. After lying unconscious in the snow for days, he was found by Tartars who rubbed him with fat and wrapped him up in felt so that he was gradually able to recover his body heat. These two substances henceforth remained connected in his mind with the idea of rebirth from death by freezing through the heat-producing power of fat and the insulating capacities of felt. To this extent the substances in question form part of a personal mythology.
The decisive thing, however, is that Beuys does not stop here but goes on to develop a theory of material substance arising out of his quasi-mythical experience. In this theory the felt functions as an insulator and protective covering but also as a material that permits the penetration of external influences as well. The grey colour is intended to evoke in the onlooker the whole wealth of the normal colour spectrum through a kind of reversal effect. And finally the sound-absorbent qualities of felt represent silence. (13) Thus a whole dialectic of meaning is ascribed to the material (at once insulating element from and connecting element with the outside world, at once colourlessness and wealth of colour), a meaning which is then further realized in the artist's 'actions'.
What interests Beuys about fat is the different states of the substance as a whole: more or less solid when cold, more fluid under the influence of heat. It thus becomes a privileged object for demonstrating his theory of sculpture which distinguishes between chaotic (warm) states and organized (cold) states:
My initial intention in using fat was to stimulate discussion. The flexibility of the material appealed to me particularly in its reactions to temperature changes. This flexibility is psychologically effective - people instinctively feel it relates to inner processes and feelings. The discussion I wanted was about the potential of sculpture and culture, what they mean, what language is about, what human production and creativity are about. So I took an extreme position in sculpture, and a material that was very basic to life and not associated with art. (14)
Beuys creates a sort of alphabet for himself out of the materials. It is one which does not consist of phonemes but of complex concepts. We can certainly reidentify the meaning that he ascribes to the sensuous materials but this meaning does not arise inevitably from the immediate sensuous impression itself. Thus a piece of work like the Fat Corner, which was to be seen in the exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum, did not merely consist in the perceptible object itself, namely the fat smeared into the corner of the room, but also in the self-interpretation and commentary contained in the catalogue and finally in the photograph which almost alienates the plastic object into a two-dimensional form. The onlooker simultaneously becomes a reader who is encouraged to perceive a projected complex of meaning, in this case the opposition between the strict organizing principle of the right angles in the corner of the room and the semi-fluid fat which announces the mutability of 'social sculpture'.
But the viewer is also exposed to quite different impressions: the stains on the wall, the rancid and slightly repellent smell of the melting fat which has long since lost the original triangular shape caught in the photograph. The associations produced in the onlooker by these impressions point in a quite different direction from the conceptual interpretation laid down by Beuys himself. Similar considerations also apply to his works in felt. The piles consisting of one hundred square pieces of felt covered by a copper sheet signify a heat-battery for Beuys: 'These felt piles [ . . . ] are aggregates, and the copper sheets are conductors.' (15) The association produced in the onlooker by the work is more likely to be that of some bleak warehouse in which every object is just the same as any other. The allegorical meaning which Beuys has ascribed to the materials is overlaid with others arising out of the immediate act of perception.
The return of symbolic form
How far these different levels of meaning can diverge from one another can be seen from Beuys's 'action' entitled How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare. Beuys is sitting on a stool with its single leg wound about with felt; he has poured honey over his head; he has attached an iron sole to this right foot while his left foot rests upon an equally large felt sole; in his lap he cradles a dead hare; his right hand is raised in a confessional gesture; a number of drawings can be made out on the wall behind him. This stage of the action is all captured in a photograph by Ute Kolphaus. (16) The polemical content of the scene is quickly grasped by the onlooker: even a dead animal has a greater understanding of art than most people do (while the action takes place the gallery doors are closed and Beuys can only be seen from outside through the windows).
The scene owes its pathos not least to the sight of the head covered in honey. Beuys connects this image with a clearly defined allegorical meaning: the head is the organ of rational-thought which has ossified into deathly rigidity. By pouring the living substance of honey over his head, Beuys suggests that thought too can be a living thing, can become a different kind of thinking.17 The scenic allegory presents us with that very semantic displacement which we already encountered in his public utterances.
So much for the intended meaning of the scene. But someone who looks at the photograph sees something quite different: a head that appears disfigured by the blistering wounds of war and whose blank gaze contradicts the peculiar vitality of the hand. The stool leg entwined with felt, the vaguely perceptible switch of an electric appliance and the shoe wrapped up (in wire?) beside it evoke associations of bondage and torture. The emotive power of the image does not reflect the allegorical intention of the performer of the action, but rather cuts across it. Beuys certainly says something to us here but what he says is not the same as what he meant to say.
What is the significance of this discrepancy between the allegorical self-interpretation of the artist and the symbolically interpreted visual experience of the onlooker? It would certainly be a mistake to play off one of these levels of meaning at the expense of the other. We cannot simply repudiate the allegory constructed by the artist as a quantité négligeable for it belongs to the work just as much as the emblematic subscriptio belonged to baroque art. Nor should we simply regard the meaning produced by the onlooker through the sensuous encounter with the object as a purely subjective contribution, especially since this interpretation is more likely to meet with intersubjective agreement than that proposed by the artist.
We shall have to move back and forth between these levels of meaning which produce an extremely complex structure. If we must consider the allegorical self-interpretation of the artist as something which belongs to Beuys's works (and this seems to me to be beyond question), then we can learn precisely from these works that the subjectively projected meaning cannot be maintained. This does not imply that this meaning simply disappears. Once publically enunciated or formulated in a catalogue the meaning is already present but it remains only loosely connected with the object. What we actually experience here is the simultaneous constitution and disintegration of allegory. We recognize the allegorical projection of the artist but we immediately abandon it because it does not coincide with what we see.
The phenomenon we have described here must not be confused with the multiple levels of significance ordinarily encountered in works of art. In that case we certainly discover different meanings but they are all located on the same plane as it were. But here that is precisely not the case. Beuys imposes a clearly defined allegorical meaning on to his materials which we can certainly recognize intellectually but this meaning is not strictly bound to what we sensuously perceive. Consequently the object perceived enters into a symbolic sphere of meaning for us in which it is not grasped as a sign for something else but rather as identical with its meaning (however unclear the latter may be).
Benjamin's rehabilitation of the concept of allegory has played such an important role in contemporary aesthetic theory because with this concept the two sides of what we call form, namely the sensuous perceptible moment and the intellectual meaning (object and subject), are not fused into a unity but are preserved in their difference from one another. Thus allegory appears as a model that allows us to transcend the metaphysical presuppositions of idealist aesthetics and to turn the bifurcation which dominates our actual existence into a constitutive experiential principle of art.
If our observations about Beuys's work are well founded we come up against a limit here in the attempt to subject the domain of art to the characteristically modern principle of rationality (in the sociological sense). In so far as allegory preserves the distinction between the sensuously given and the meaning as independent terms and attempts to establish an unambiguous relation between them, then in its very structure it represents a model which corresponds to the principle of rationality. For both of them rest upon the separation of subject and object. The symbol, on the other hand, in which the sensuous moment cannot be separated from what it means, remains bound up with a metaphysical concept of form which is modelled on the idealist idea of the subject-object. Now if it turns out that we cannot help also reading Beuys's allegories as symbols, then it would seem that a certain metaphysical model still shapes our aesthetic experience. It is perfectly true that we can lay bare the metaphysical basis of this aesthetic experience through critical reflection but we cannot simply avoid it in our actual dealings with art.
From this vantage point I would now like to return to the problem of post-modernity as formulated above. Most critics are agreed in describing this situation as a Babel of quotation and a confusion of styles. The positions which we can take up towards this state of affairs (either the happy eclecticism of 'anything goes' or the decisionistic assertion of one advanced material) are both equally unsatisfactory. In saying this we have not solved the problem of evaluation (and to that extent we must agree with Kilb). What can our analysis of. Beuys's work contribute to a solution here? In the first place it should teach theory a certain modesty. With respect both to production and experiential reception theory remains heteronomous.
It can help to conceptualize the aesthetic as its exists (and that is not an inconsiderable achievement) but it cannot on its own resources establish criteria. When theory attempts to do so, it constantly runs the risk of disgracing itself in front of the works which it simply obscures because its would-be illumination misses them altogether. We cannot leap ahead theoretically and claim that allegory realizes itself in the distintegration of projected meaning and thus gives rise to symbolic meaning out of itself for example. Even after the event we should not attempt to erect this particular structure as a criterion of contemporary art. Beuys is a unique case. Nevertheless, we should be permitted to compare and contrast the paintings of Die Neuen Wilden with his works.
For this reveals the problems in such an unproblematic return to panel painting, to joyful colourism and secure line. In comparison with the broken unsure line of Beuys's drawings, in which technical facility gives way to a more tentative jotting, much contemporary painting makes a rather external effect. The success such painting achieves is not unlike that of Makart.
These remarks are simply intended to show that evaluation is possible even without a firm theoretical framework which decrees what the most advanced level of artistic material is. Only when theory becomes modest enough to admit its heteronomy will it be able to practice that 'immersion in the matter at hand' which Adorno claimed for himself but certainly did not always succeed in realizing.
In his famous essay of 1919, 'La Crise de l'Esprit', Valéry describes the epoch before the First World War as an Alexandrine chaos of styles, allusions and borrowings:
Dans tel livre de cette époque - et non des plus médiocres - on trouve, sans aucun effort: - une influence des ballets russes, - un peu du style sombre de Pascal, beaucoup d'impressions du type Goncourt, - quelque chose de Nietzsche, - quelque chose de Rimbaud, - certains effets dus à la fréquentation des peintres, et parfois le ton des publications scientifiques, - le tout parfumé d'un je ne sais quoi de britannique difficile à doser! (18)
This description astonishes us. For at least in the field of the visual and the plastic arts the decade immediately preceding the First World War appears to us as the heroic epoch of modernist art. Fauvism, cubism, the Blue Rider - these decisive innovations in twentieth-century painting all arose in this period. But nothing of all this appears before the theorist's gaze, which seems dazzled by a mirror that has shattered into a thousand splinters. If such important contemporary phenomena could escape a thinker of such sensitivity and perspicacity as Valéry, then we cannot reject out of hand the possibility that something similar could happen to us. Perhaps we cannot see the epochal art of our own time, dazzled by the colourful ambitious canvasses of the New Fauves.
Even Berman's fear that the universal aestheticization of everyday life could finally lead to a situation in which there would no longer be anything outside art and the latter would therefore disappear can be allayed by considering the case of Beuys. Certainly Beuys did abandon himself to the media. Even those at the greatest remove from the world of avant-garde art still recognized the man with the felt hat and had an instant judgement to pass on him if required. Yet his works remained esoteric, inaccessible even to those who attempted to follow the self-commentaries of the artist. If popularity and esotericism can be so intimately connected with one another in this way, we may well suppose that art will remain capable of effecting a distancing movement in which it opposes itself to the everyday world as its other. The manner in which Beuys both adopts and revokes the avant-garde project of transcending art, operating from an increasingly indistinct borderline between art and non-art, shows how the practice of the artist already finds itself in advance of the legitimate fears of the theoretician. While we anxiously try and formulate the question, the answer has long since been found but we simply do not see it. It required the death of Joseph Beuys before we could finally see it so clearly.
Notes
1. This is also true for Jean Baudrillard's claim that the opposition between essence and appearance has disappeared in favour of the universalization of the 'simulacrum' (L'Echange symbolique et la mort (Paris, 1976)). Cf. ch.
2: 'L'Ordre des Simulacres'. Baudrillard's thought itself presupposes precisely that level which is not appearance and whose abolition he asserts.
2. Cf. H. Böhringer, 'Postmodernität [...]', in his Begriffsfelder. Von der Philosophie zur Kunst (Berlin, 1985), pp. 55-61, esp. p. 60.
3. The remarks in parentheses refer to A. Kilb, Die Allegorische Phantasie [...], F. Feher, Der Pyrrhussieg der Kunst im Kampf um ihre Befreiung [...] , R. A. Berman, Konsumgesellschaft. Das Erbe der Avantgarde und die falsche Aufhebung der ästhetischen Autonomie, in: Postmoderne: Alltag, Allegorie und Avantgarde, eds. C. and P. Bürger (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 648, Frankfurt 1987). An English version of Berman's essay is available in his book Modern Culture and Critical Theory (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1989), pp. 42-53.
4. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, 'Die Moderne - ein unvollendetes Projekt', in his Kleine Politischen Schriften I-PV (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 450.
5. Cf. Ferenc Feher, 'What is beyond art. On the theories of postmodernity', Thesis Eleven, no. 5/6 (1982), pp. 5-19. In this connection we should also mention Rüdiger Bubner who in an essay entitled 'Moderne Ersatzfunktionen des Ästhetischen' attacks among other things the avant-garde notion that creativity is a capacity innate in all human beings, who in most cases are merely prevented from developing it by the force of circumstances (cf. the beginning of André Breton's Premier Manifeste du surréalisme). Bubner writes: 'Celebrated artists, whose outstanding achievements are rewarded with prizes, assure us that we are all born artists, even if we do not all meet with similar success.' The allusion to Joseph Beuys is obvious. (In Merkur, no. 444 (Feb. 1986), pp. 91-107, here p. 95.)
6. U. K. Preuss recognizes the distinction between legality and morality as a fundamental and irreversible one as far as the modern constitutional state is concerned. But he too feels forced to consider the necessity for a 'reintegration of politics and morality' in view of the quite new world-historical situation which has made the idea of war unthinkable (Politische Verantwortung und Bürgerloyalität [. . . ] (Frankfurt, 1984), p. 38 and p. 211. Cf. also pp. 22ff).
7. J. Beuys, Dank an Wilhelm Lehmbruck, printed in taz, 27 Jan. 1986, p. 2.
8. Ibid.
9. J. Beuys, Zeichnungen [...], exhibition in the National Gallery of Berlin (Munich, 1979), p. 31.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 35.
12. Quoted in Der Hang zum Gesamtkunstwerk I... J, exhibition in the Kunsthaus of Zurich (Aarau/Frankfurt, 1983), p. 424.
13. Caroline Tisdall, Joseph Beuys (The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, New York, 1979), p. 120.
14. Ibid., p. 72.
15. Ibid., p. 162.
16. Ibid., p. 102
17. Ibid., p. 105.
18. Paul Valéry, Œuvres vol. 1, ed. J. Hytier (Bibl. de la Pléiade, Paris, 1957), p. 992.
In: The Decline of Modernism. Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, pp. 147-161.
Unrestricted quotation, allegory without reference, the independence of the signifier and the dissolution of art into a completely aestheticized everydayness: all these attempts to define the nature of the post-modern have one thing in common. They all assert the levelling down of oppositions which had remained valid ones for the modern age. This process must not be confused with the dialectical one known as 'sublation' ('Aufhebung'): the oppositions here are not 'sublated' in a third term but are rather eliminated as such in so far as one of the two terms in question drops out altogether.
If a quotation no longer makes a specifically determinate reference to the work from which it has been taken but rather by virtue of vague allusion to the themes or techniques of another author or even epoch actually determines an image or text in its entirety, then the opposition between text and quotation disappears. The image is a quotation - but it no longer quotes anything determinate, for in order to do so it would have to construct a context against which that which is quoted could stand out in relief.
The appeal to allegory, which does not link the individual elements of a work symbolically according to an organic principle but in accordance with the principle of 'meaning', became important for the aesthetics of modernity because it enabled the artist to escape the confines of idealist aesthetics which had forced us to conceive of form and content in art according to the metaphysical schema of subject and object. But when under the sign of post-modernist thought the meaning which connects the parts is not merely loosened but actually revoked, then all that remains of allegory is a heap of fragments and unconnected signs. And when the signifier is no longer tied to the signified, then reference is replaced by movement through an infinite chain of signifiers. When, finally, art is dissolved into an aestheticized everyday world, art can no longer be perceived as a specific domain at all.
In so far as the kind of post-modernist discourse outlined here still makes any theoretical claims, it is susceptible to an immanent critique. We expect a theory to be able to explain the conditions of its own possibility either systematically or historically. Post-modernist discourse is not in a position to do so. There is a drawing by the Italian artist Clemente which depicts two figures running past one another in opposite directions, each of them holding on to one of the sides of a ring that bears the inscription 'symbolon'. Just as this programmatic drawing, which asserts the fragmentation of the sign, can only be understood as long as we suppose a semiotic system that remains intact, so too all post-modernist talk about the indepen¬dence of the signifier does indeed employ a semiotic system that recognizes the opposition of signifier and signified. Post-modernist discourse is not only unable to identify the position from which it speaks, it demonstrates precisely its own impossibility. (1)
One might expect that any discourse the groundlessness of which has been exposed by immanent critique is thereby already disposed of. But this is not the case. In fact the fascination with post-modernist discourse persists. It must therefore draw its compelling power from sources other than internal consistency. In this connection it is tempting to think of the catastrophic aura that hangs over the world-historical horizon of the present age. Where the very survival of human life is put in question, the category of meaning also becomes questionable. Certainly this is not sufficient by itself to explain the collapse of our system of signs but it lets us glimpse the experiential context of a mode of thought which in the face of the, unthinkable is no longer prepared to bow to the force of rational argument.
Reflections of this kind can render two aspects of the problem intelligible: on the one hand the fascination which such thinking exercises upon us, on the other hand the great lack of understanding; which prevails between the post-modernist thinkers and their critics, The conclusions which can be drawn from this situation touch upon; the limits of the kind of thought which views everything within the fixed perspective of catastrophe. After we have admitted the debilitation of rational argument produced by the historical situation, we will have to return to such argument once again because it seems to offer us the only means of clarifying our situation.
If we attempt to grasp post-modernist thought not as a stringent theory but as the expression of an epochal predicament, then it has to be taken seriously as such. This does not mean that we must accept it in all the abundance of its very different forms. On the contrary we can take up quite different positions with respect to these various forms:
1. Certainly the simplest is the happy hedonism of 'anything goes'. Particularly in the aesthetic field this is a view strongly suggested by the prevailing state of affairs. The coexistence of so many different artistic movements will then appear as a legitimate expression of pluralism, from which anyone can draw what suits their purposes, and the confusion of quotations from the most diverse contexts combined in a single work as an ironic playing with tradition.
2. Anyone who suspects such a simple endorsement of the post-modern predicament in which all variety is treated as equivalent and spread out before us in a single dimension, can find a more subtle form of endorsement with a Nietzschean gesture that affirms a radical rupture. Anyone taking this line can criticize the false riches of post-modern multiplicity initially in order then to reach a position of non-participation through a (fictive) leap out of their own time, a position which would allow them to take positive possession of what was criticized before. What formerly presented itself as a purely arbitrary choice now becomes the product of an act on the part of the subject, an act of 'neutralization'. (2)
3. If on the other hand we understand the post-modern situation as one in which the multiplicity of historical models that are indiscriminately appropriated for our purposes merely obscures the lack of work valid for our own age (in other words as a situation of historicism and eclecticism), then we cannot avoid enquiring after a standard, something which strict modernism found in the concept of advanced material. And here there are two paths we can take: either we pursue the question whether even in the post-modern age advanced artistic material in Adorno's sense can still be identified (cf. Kilb's contribution to this problem), or we attempt to understand the causes which have led to an uncertainty concerning aesthetic standards, if not to their disappearance altogether (cf. the contributions of Berman and Feher).(3) Both these paths are viable but they are not without certain risks of their own.
The danger inherent in the first approach lies in reproducing Adorno's decisionism. If it is true that the artistic developments of the 1970s and 1980s have rendered his position untenable and furthermore have opened our eyes to everything that Adorno was driven to exclude from the domain of valid works of art in order to hold fast to his rigorous concept of modernism, then we have to ask whether it is desirable to try and renew this concept.
Furthermore we should bear in mind that the concept of advanced artistic material presupposes a logic of material development which can certainly be verified for particular artistic domains in narrowly defined periods (as in the development of cubism prior to 1914 for example) but which cannot be regarded as possessing a uniform character, even during the periods of classical modernism (Kandinsky and the cubists do not follow the same logic of the material, not to mention the surrealists).
Of course the way in which Kilb opposes his 'one thing only goes' to the 'anything goes' approach is impressive: the play of empty allegorical references. But it seems to me that this does not really help us to get a conceptual grasp upon the very different types of authentic artistic achievement in the present, neither Peter Weiss's Ästhetik des Widerstands, nor the work/non-work of Joseph Beuys, for example, and this despite the fact that the latter does pursue specifically allegorical intentions. Whereas a systematic critique of post-modernist discourse seeks to identify its contradictions, a historically oriented critique enquires into its origins. In relation to the realm of aesthetic products the question becomes the following: how have we come to give up that separation established in modernity between the work of art as the centre of interest on the one side and the everyday world and trivial art on the other, and along with that the strict modernist concept of form, in favour of an uninhibited eclecticism and a tendency towards ubiqui¬tous quotation?
If criticism seeks a guilty party in this process, it will be able to discover it in the historical avant-garde movements of the past. For these movements in fact attempted to eliminate the distinction between art and the practice of everyday life and to loosen up the relationship with trivial art and indeed also succeeded in putting in question the rigorous modernist concept of form (through the idea of écriture automatique, for example). Nevertheless, the assignment of guilt attempted in this connection by Berman remains a questionable undertaking. The universal aestheticization of American everyday life which he describes so convincingly more probably results from the imperatives of capitalist commodity production, or more precisely from the compulsion to perpetuate a consumer stimulus, than from the (however misdirected) project of a particular artistic group. Is not Berman here adopting a conservative model of cultural criticism which 'transposes the unpleasant costs resulting from a more or less successful process of capitalist modernization to modern culture itself [in this case the avant-garde movement]?'(4)
Now Berman is not alone in this critique of the avant-garde, formulated as it is under the impact of post-modernism. Ferenc Fehér's argumentation also tends in this direction, (5) and Jürgen Habermas, who decisively rejects the aesthetic anti-modernism of Daniel Bell, also clearly takes up a position against the avant-garde movements. Habermas perceives serious dangers for society in the avant-garde's attempt to 'de-differentiate' the different cultural spheres.
For Habermas the differentiation of the spheres of science, morality and art in fact represents a historical progress and he suspects the attempt to question this differentiation of powers as a regressive wish. However, it can hardly be denied that the insulation which obtains between the individual cultural spheres is one serious problem in our culture. The uncoupling of politics from morality certainly represented a progressive development in the time of Hobbes but it becomes very probematic in an age when the technical potential for destruction has grown to such a degree that all human life can be wiped off the face of the earth. (6) And similar considerations apply to the uncoupling of science from morality as well.
It is precisely the success of science (in the field of genetic engineering, for example) which now makes it imperative for us to bring science back once again into a productive relationship with morality. As far as art is concerned, the pursuit of what one could call the obstinate autonomy of the aesthetic simultaneously represents both an advance and a loss of those dimensions which only become available to art if it ventures out of the secure domain of the aesthetic that has been allotted to it.
These remarks are intended to suggest that we should not simply account the aforementioned separation of domains as a case of historical progress. It is not merely reconnecting the results obtained by a culture of 'experts' back to the life-world that represents a major cultural problem for our society but also and above all the separation of the spheres as such. And it is a merit of the avant-garde movements to have exposed this problem, quite independently of the question whether the solutions they proposed have actually proved feasible or not.
It is perhaps here that we encounter the limits of an approach that tries to impose upon us a dichotomous schema of either-or. Thus either the separation of cultural domains represents historical progress, in which case it is to be accepted and the consequent problems dealt with as they arise (like that of 'reconnecting' with the life-world, for example); or it represents an evil, in which case we must strive to eliminate it and face up to the regressive consequences of this project. Either we accept art as an autonomous institution, in which case any attempt to go beyond this situation must be denounced as a false transcendence; or we adopt the avant-garde position, in which case we must in all consequence also propose the abolition of museums and theatres. Either we cling to the possibility of aesthetic evaluation, in which case we affirm the concept of advanced material even against our better historical judgement; or we accept the free utilization of any material and thus renounce all attempts to evaluate the aesthetic object.
As formulated here, these dichotomies might seem to suggest a decision in favour of the first alternative in each case. But since we have already seen that this option is burdened with specific problems of its own, we should ask ourselves whether the formulation of these alternatives in terms of an either-or decision might not be the very problem. Not merely because on closer examination we recognize that the 'or' position offered to us is such an unattractive alternative that it cannot possibly be accepted but because the dichotomous schema might not in fact do justice to the facts themselves.
Instead of trying to isolate the avant-garde impulse, we should ask ourselves whether it might contain a potential which could still be developed, if art is to be more than an institution that compensates for problems arising from the process of social modernization. Without that diabolical element in the avant-garde impulse towards the transcendence of art as an institution the art of the post-modern age might well rapidly degenerate into a kind of salon art without the salon. Theory is unable to produce by itself an answer to the question whether there is a third position that could release us from the compulsive logic of either-or (which in truth compels us to opt for the 'either'). Theory can recognize what has come to pass historically but cannot lay down what shall be.
Consequently I shall conclude the theoretical discussion here and turn instead to an analysis of certain aspects of the work of Joseph Beuys, a prototypical representative of the avant-garde artist in the period after the end of the historical avant-garde movement. But I would not like the following analysis to be misinterpreted simply as an exposition of a theoretical problem which could equally well be presented with reference to some other artist. Beuys cannot be regarded as a test case and that is precisely what makes him relevant for theoretical reflection. The internal break in my argument recognizes the heteronomy of theory. If the latter understands anything, it can only do so by reference to the things themselves.
The transgressor
No one can doubt that Beuys belongs in the tradition of the historical avant-garde movement. He has stressed as much himself in the speech he delivered on receiving the Lehmbruck prize. There he tells us that he is concerned with 'a basic idea for the renewal of the social whole, one which leads in the direction of social sculpture'. (7) He takes up the Utopian project of the historical avant-garde which was once formulated by Breton as the creation of a world which men could finally live in ('un monde enfin habitable'). But Beuys also knows that the avant-garde movement was unable to realize this project and that he too will not be able to realize it. All that remains is to 'pass on the flame'. (8)
I have spoken about the failure of the historical avant-garde movement myself in my Theory of the Avant-garde. And if one compares the project with what became of it, this talk of failure is certainly apposite. But such a judgement itself remains caught within the logic of the either-or. If we leave this logic behind, it seems questionable whether a Utopian project can ever fail since it is so intimately connected with that hope that can never be disappointed, according to the dictum of Ernst Bloch. We can also express this idea in another way: failure is the mode in which the avant-garde artist reaffirms the Utopian quality of the project, a project that would always be transformed into something else if it were to be realized.
Dadaism and early surrealism were sustained by the hope that the hidden potential for creativity and imagination could be released simply by destroying art as an autonomous institution separated from the practice of real life. Hence that assault upon institutional art the shrill vehemence of which will never be equalled again. Now there is hardly a trace of all this in Beuys. It is certainly true that he distances himself from the concept of the artist, 'which is just what I do not wish to be.' (9) But this distancing gesture lacks the polemical edge which characterized the dadaist declarations. Whereas Raoul Hausmann spits at Goethe, Beuys can actually appeal to him as a writer who entertained a concept of science different from the dominant one of his time and as a man who pursued both art and science in exactly the same spirit. Instead of a direct attack upon art as an institution, what we see here is a movement which leads us away from art without completely abandoning it in the process.
'I actually have nothing to do with art - and this is the only possibility which permits us to do something for art.' (10) This paradoxical formulation captures a situation in which artistic achievement becomes dependent upon the capacity of the artist to transgress the institutional limits of art. Since what we have accustomed ourselves to calling the failure of the historical avant-garde movement the original impulse to transcend art has been transformed: it now knows that it is dependent upon what it rejects.
In fact Beuys wishes to produce a change in our attitudes, to establish a new relationship towards our own senses and the materials with which they come into contact, as well as towards the realm of thought and that which transcends the sensuous. But since the era of aestheticism the idea of transforming our modes of perception has become an empty cliche devoid of any experiential significance. Consequently, Beuys can no longer pursue his aims within the institutional context of art. On the other hand he cannot simply abandon the latter if he does not wish to repeat the avant-garde assault upon it. So it is that he becomes a transgressor who simultaneously transposes the borderlines that he constantly violates now from this direction and now from that. When one of his conversation partners tentatively described his drawings as 'a particular kind of exploration', Beuys agreed but immediately went on to add: 'Nevertheless I have not let myself lose sight of art altogether. Art as such is what I wanted to achieve. We have not yet achieved it.' (11) The paradox that we still have no art ('for it does not yet exist') only makes sense if we presuppose a concept of art quite different from the traditional one, a new 'totalized' concept of art as Beuys describes it. 'All human questions can only be questions of shaping and that is what I mean by the totalised concept of art. The concept refers to the possibility that everyone can in principle be a creative being as well as to questions concerning society as a whole.' (12)
Beuys has a peculiar way of using concepts which we could describe as a kind of semantic displacement. He certainly employs traditional terms but he transposes the semantic core of these concepts by bringing them into close proximity with a number of quite different ones which he also displaces in turn. Thus he transposes the concept of art by bringing it into a close relationship with that of science, but he differentiates the latter from the currently prevailing concept of science and defines it without regard to any methodological features. On another occasion the concept of art is transposed into an all-encompassing idea of 'shaping' which is not, on the other hand, supposed to exhaust the content of the concept. For, as a counterpart to this extension of meaning, Beuys still clings to the idea of a specifically artistic form of activity and speaks of 'social sculpture' in this connection.
It is quite pointless to accuse Beuys of being logically inconsistent in his use of language here. On the contrary we must understand these inconsistencies as an appropriate expression of the fact that Beuys is working from an impossible position - one that is located neither inside nor outside of art as an institution but on a borderline that he constantly negates at the same time.
Material allegory
Beuys introduced two new materials into the domain of plastic art: fat and felt. His employment of these materials goes back to a traumatic experience of his own but their significance is not exhausted by the allusion they make to that experience. In 1943 Beuys's fighter plane crashed in the Crimea. After lying unconscious in the snow for days, he was found by Tartars who rubbed him with fat and wrapped him up in felt so that he was gradually able to recover his body heat. These two substances henceforth remained connected in his mind with the idea of rebirth from death by freezing through the heat-producing power of fat and the insulating capacities of felt. To this extent the substances in question form part of a personal mythology.
The decisive thing, however, is that Beuys does not stop here but goes on to develop a theory of material substance arising out of his quasi-mythical experience. In this theory the felt functions as an insulator and protective covering but also as a material that permits the penetration of external influences as well. The grey colour is intended to evoke in the onlooker the whole wealth of the normal colour spectrum through a kind of reversal effect. And finally the sound-absorbent qualities of felt represent silence. (13) Thus a whole dialectic of meaning is ascribed to the material (at once insulating element from and connecting element with the outside world, at once colourlessness and wealth of colour), a meaning which is then further realized in the artist's 'actions'.
What interests Beuys about fat is the different states of the substance as a whole: more or less solid when cold, more fluid under the influence of heat. It thus becomes a privileged object for demonstrating his theory of sculpture which distinguishes between chaotic (warm) states and organized (cold) states:
My initial intention in using fat was to stimulate discussion. The flexibility of the material appealed to me particularly in its reactions to temperature changes. This flexibility is psychologically effective - people instinctively feel it relates to inner processes and feelings. The discussion I wanted was about the potential of sculpture and culture, what they mean, what language is about, what human production and creativity are about. So I took an extreme position in sculpture, and a material that was very basic to life and not associated with art. (14)
Beuys creates a sort of alphabet for himself out of the materials. It is one which does not consist of phonemes but of complex concepts. We can certainly reidentify the meaning that he ascribes to the sensuous materials but this meaning does not arise inevitably from the immediate sensuous impression itself. Thus a piece of work like the Fat Corner, which was to be seen in the exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum, did not merely consist in the perceptible object itself, namely the fat smeared into the corner of the room, but also in the self-interpretation and commentary contained in the catalogue and finally in the photograph which almost alienates the plastic object into a two-dimensional form. The onlooker simultaneously becomes a reader who is encouraged to perceive a projected complex of meaning, in this case the opposition between the strict organizing principle of the right angles in the corner of the room and the semi-fluid fat which announces the mutability of 'social sculpture'.
But the viewer is also exposed to quite different impressions: the stains on the wall, the rancid and slightly repellent smell of the melting fat which has long since lost the original triangular shape caught in the photograph. The associations produced in the onlooker by these impressions point in a quite different direction from the conceptual interpretation laid down by Beuys himself. Similar considerations also apply to his works in felt. The piles consisting of one hundred square pieces of felt covered by a copper sheet signify a heat-battery for Beuys: 'These felt piles [ . . . ] are aggregates, and the copper sheets are conductors.' (15) The association produced in the onlooker by the work is more likely to be that of some bleak warehouse in which every object is just the same as any other. The allegorical meaning which Beuys has ascribed to the materials is overlaid with others arising out of the immediate act of perception.
The return of symbolic form
How far these different levels of meaning can diverge from one another can be seen from Beuys's 'action' entitled How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare. Beuys is sitting on a stool with its single leg wound about with felt; he has poured honey over his head; he has attached an iron sole to this right foot while his left foot rests upon an equally large felt sole; in his lap he cradles a dead hare; his right hand is raised in a confessional gesture; a number of drawings can be made out on the wall behind him. This stage of the action is all captured in a photograph by Ute Kolphaus. (16) The polemical content of the scene is quickly grasped by the onlooker: even a dead animal has a greater understanding of art than most people do (while the action takes place the gallery doors are closed and Beuys can only be seen from outside through the windows).
The scene owes its pathos not least to the sight of the head covered in honey. Beuys connects this image with a clearly defined allegorical meaning: the head is the organ of rational-thought which has ossified into deathly rigidity. By pouring the living substance of honey over his head, Beuys suggests that thought too can be a living thing, can become a different kind of thinking.17 The scenic allegory presents us with that very semantic displacement which we already encountered in his public utterances.
So much for the intended meaning of the scene. But someone who looks at the photograph sees something quite different: a head that appears disfigured by the blistering wounds of war and whose blank gaze contradicts the peculiar vitality of the hand. The stool leg entwined with felt, the vaguely perceptible switch of an electric appliance and the shoe wrapped up (in wire?) beside it evoke associations of bondage and torture. The emotive power of the image does not reflect the allegorical intention of the performer of the action, but rather cuts across it. Beuys certainly says something to us here but what he says is not the same as what he meant to say.
What is the significance of this discrepancy between the allegorical self-interpretation of the artist and the symbolically interpreted visual experience of the onlooker? It would certainly be a mistake to play off one of these levels of meaning at the expense of the other. We cannot simply repudiate the allegory constructed by the artist as a quantité négligeable for it belongs to the work just as much as the emblematic subscriptio belonged to baroque art. Nor should we simply regard the meaning produced by the onlooker through the sensuous encounter with the object as a purely subjective contribution, especially since this interpretation is more likely to meet with intersubjective agreement than that proposed by the artist.
We shall have to move back and forth between these levels of meaning which produce an extremely complex structure. If we must consider the allegorical self-interpretation of the artist as something which belongs to Beuys's works (and this seems to me to be beyond question), then we can learn precisely from these works that the subjectively projected meaning cannot be maintained. This does not imply that this meaning simply disappears. Once publically enunciated or formulated in a catalogue the meaning is already present but it remains only loosely connected with the object. What we actually experience here is the simultaneous constitution and disintegration of allegory. We recognize the allegorical projection of the artist but we immediately abandon it because it does not coincide with what we see.
The phenomenon we have described here must not be confused with the multiple levels of significance ordinarily encountered in works of art. In that case we certainly discover different meanings but they are all located on the same plane as it were. But here that is precisely not the case. Beuys imposes a clearly defined allegorical meaning on to his materials which we can certainly recognize intellectually but this meaning is not strictly bound to what we sensuously perceive. Consequently the object perceived enters into a symbolic sphere of meaning for us in which it is not grasped as a sign for something else but rather as identical with its meaning (however unclear the latter may be).
Benjamin's rehabilitation of the concept of allegory has played such an important role in contemporary aesthetic theory because with this concept the two sides of what we call form, namely the sensuous perceptible moment and the intellectual meaning (object and subject), are not fused into a unity but are preserved in their difference from one another. Thus allegory appears as a model that allows us to transcend the metaphysical presuppositions of idealist aesthetics and to turn the bifurcation which dominates our actual existence into a constitutive experiential principle of art.
If our observations about Beuys's work are well founded we come up against a limit here in the attempt to subject the domain of art to the characteristically modern principle of rationality (in the sociological sense). In so far as allegory preserves the distinction between the sensuously given and the meaning as independent terms and attempts to establish an unambiguous relation between them, then in its very structure it represents a model which corresponds to the principle of rationality. For both of them rest upon the separation of subject and object. The symbol, on the other hand, in which the sensuous moment cannot be separated from what it means, remains bound up with a metaphysical concept of form which is modelled on the idealist idea of the subject-object. Now if it turns out that we cannot help also reading Beuys's allegories as symbols, then it would seem that a certain metaphysical model still shapes our aesthetic experience. It is perfectly true that we can lay bare the metaphysical basis of this aesthetic experience through critical reflection but we cannot simply avoid it in our actual dealings with art.
From this vantage point I would now like to return to the problem of post-modernity as formulated above. Most critics are agreed in describing this situation as a Babel of quotation and a confusion of styles. The positions which we can take up towards this state of affairs (either the happy eclecticism of 'anything goes' or the decisionistic assertion of one advanced material) are both equally unsatisfactory. In saying this we have not solved the problem of evaluation (and to that extent we must agree with Kilb). What can our analysis of. Beuys's work contribute to a solution here? In the first place it should teach theory a certain modesty. With respect both to production and experiential reception theory remains heteronomous.
It can help to conceptualize the aesthetic as its exists (and that is not an inconsiderable achievement) but it cannot on its own resources establish criteria. When theory attempts to do so, it constantly runs the risk of disgracing itself in front of the works which it simply obscures because its would-be illumination misses them altogether. We cannot leap ahead theoretically and claim that allegory realizes itself in the distintegration of projected meaning and thus gives rise to symbolic meaning out of itself for example. Even after the event we should not attempt to erect this particular structure as a criterion of contemporary art. Beuys is a unique case. Nevertheless, we should be permitted to compare and contrast the paintings of Die Neuen Wilden with his works.
For this reveals the problems in such an unproblematic return to panel painting, to joyful colourism and secure line. In comparison with the broken unsure line of Beuys's drawings, in which technical facility gives way to a more tentative jotting, much contemporary painting makes a rather external effect. The success such painting achieves is not unlike that of Makart.
These remarks are simply intended to show that evaluation is possible even without a firm theoretical framework which decrees what the most advanced level of artistic material is. Only when theory becomes modest enough to admit its heteronomy will it be able to practice that 'immersion in the matter at hand' which Adorno claimed for himself but certainly did not always succeed in realizing.
In his famous essay of 1919, 'La Crise de l'Esprit', Valéry describes the epoch before the First World War as an Alexandrine chaos of styles, allusions and borrowings:
Dans tel livre de cette époque - et non des plus médiocres - on trouve, sans aucun effort: - une influence des ballets russes, - un peu du style sombre de Pascal, beaucoup d'impressions du type Goncourt, - quelque chose de Nietzsche, - quelque chose de Rimbaud, - certains effets dus à la fréquentation des peintres, et parfois le ton des publications scientifiques, - le tout parfumé d'un je ne sais quoi de britannique difficile à doser! (18)
This description astonishes us. For at least in the field of the visual and the plastic arts the decade immediately preceding the First World War appears to us as the heroic epoch of modernist art. Fauvism, cubism, the Blue Rider - these decisive innovations in twentieth-century painting all arose in this period. But nothing of all this appears before the theorist's gaze, which seems dazzled by a mirror that has shattered into a thousand splinters. If such important contemporary phenomena could escape a thinker of such sensitivity and perspicacity as Valéry, then we cannot reject out of hand the possibility that something similar could happen to us. Perhaps we cannot see the epochal art of our own time, dazzled by the colourful ambitious canvasses of the New Fauves.
Even Berman's fear that the universal aestheticization of everyday life could finally lead to a situation in which there would no longer be anything outside art and the latter would therefore disappear can be allayed by considering the case of Beuys. Certainly Beuys did abandon himself to the media. Even those at the greatest remove from the world of avant-garde art still recognized the man with the felt hat and had an instant judgement to pass on him if required. Yet his works remained esoteric, inaccessible even to those who attempted to follow the self-commentaries of the artist. If popularity and esotericism can be so intimately connected with one another in this way, we may well suppose that art will remain capable of effecting a distancing movement in which it opposes itself to the everyday world as its other. The manner in which Beuys both adopts and revokes the avant-garde project of transcending art, operating from an increasingly indistinct borderline between art and non-art, shows how the practice of the artist already finds itself in advance of the legitimate fears of the theoretician. While we anxiously try and formulate the question, the answer has long since been found but we simply do not see it. It required the death of Joseph Beuys before we could finally see it so clearly.
Notes
1. This is also true for Jean Baudrillard's claim that the opposition between essence and appearance has disappeared in favour of the universalization of the 'simulacrum' (L'Echange symbolique et la mort (Paris, 1976)). Cf. ch.
2: 'L'Ordre des Simulacres'. Baudrillard's thought itself presupposes precisely that level which is not appearance and whose abolition he asserts.
2. Cf. H. Böhringer, 'Postmodernität [...]', in his Begriffsfelder. Von der Philosophie zur Kunst (Berlin, 1985), pp. 55-61, esp. p. 60.
3. The remarks in parentheses refer to A. Kilb, Die Allegorische Phantasie [...], F. Feher, Der Pyrrhussieg der Kunst im Kampf um ihre Befreiung [...] , R. A. Berman, Konsumgesellschaft. Das Erbe der Avantgarde und die falsche Aufhebung der ästhetischen Autonomie, in: Postmoderne: Alltag, Allegorie und Avantgarde, eds. C. and P. Bürger (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 648, Frankfurt 1987). An English version of Berman's essay is available in his book Modern Culture and Critical Theory (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1989), pp. 42-53.
4. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, 'Die Moderne - ein unvollendetes Projekt', in his Kleine Politischen Schriften I-PV (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 450.
5. Cf. Ferenc Feher, 'What is beyond art. On the theories of postmodernity', Thesis Eleven, no. 5/6 (1982), pp. 5-19. In this connection we should also mention Rüdiger Bubner who in an essay entitled 'Moderne Ersatzfunktionen des Ästhetischen' attacks among other things the avant-garde notion that creativity is a capacity innate in all human beings, who in most cases are merely prevented from developing it by the force of circumstances (cf. the beginning of André Breton's Premier Manifeste du surréalisme). Bubner writes: 'Celebrated artists, whose outstanding achievements are rewarded with prizes, assure us that we are all born artists, even if we do not all meet with similar success.' The allusion to Joseph Beuys is obvious. (In Merkur, no. 444 (Feb. 1986), pp. 91-107, here p. 95.)
6. U. K. Preuss recognizes the distinction between legality and morality as a fundamental and irreversible one as far as the modern constitutional state is concerned. But he too feels forced to consider the necessity for a 'reintegration of politics and morality' in view of the quite new world-historical situation which has made the idea of war unthinkable (Politische Verantwortung und Bürgerloyalität [. . . ] (Frankfurt, 1984), p. 38 and p. 211. Cf. also pp. 22ff).
7. J. Beuys, Dank an Wilhelm Lehmbruck, printed in taz, 27 Jan. 1986, p. 2.
8. Ibid.
9. J. Beuys, Zeichnungen [...], exhibition in the National Gallery of Berlin (Munich, 1979), p. 31.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 35.
12. Quoted in Der Hang zum Gesamtkunstwerk I... J, exhibition in the Kunsthaus of Zurich (Aarau/Frankfurt, 1983), p. 424.
13. Caroline Tisdall, Joseph Beuys (The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, New York, 1979), p. 120.
14. Ibid., p. 72.
15. Ibid., p. 162.
16. Ibid., p. 102
17. Ibid., p. 105.
18. Paul Valéry, Œuvres vol. 1, ed. J. Hytier (Bibl. de la Pléiade, Paris, 1957), p. 992.
In: The Decline of Modernism. Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, pp. 147-161.
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